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ABSTRACT
COMPETITIVE INTERACTION-THE INFLUENCE OF 
STRATEGIC GROUP STRUCTURE
Sherry M. Burlingame 
Old Dominion University 
Director: Dr. Sara A. Morris
The assertion that competitive interaction is a central focus of business 
strategy emerged from the Strategic Management Research Group (SMRG) at the 
University of Maryland. The premise of this perspective is that competition among 
firms can be modeled using communication theory to explain how firms in an 
industry interact. Competition, in this framework, is represented as the series of 
actions and counteractions, termed responses, that firms undertake to position 
themselves in their industry. Thus, in this model, interaction (actions and 
responses) equates with competition. Studies conducted by the members of the 
SMRG have outlined the relationship of key variables within the Communication- 
Information Processing Model of Competitive Interaction (CIP) to measures of 
performance, a key outcome variable in strategic management research.
A factor that is hypothesized to influence the response variables within the 
model is homophily--a concept which refers to the similarity of characteristics 
between sender (the actor) and the receiver (the responder). The proposed 
relationship between homophily and response however, has been minimally 
explored. This study investigated the relationship between homophily and 
response through the development and presentation a thesis that the strategic 
group concept of firms within an industry (Hunt, 1972) can be used as a proxy for
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the homophily construct. This study investigated the influence that strategic groups 
in an industry may have on the variables representing the competitive behavior of 
firms in that industry, as captured by the Communication-lnformation Processing 
Model of Competitive Interaction.
The intersections between the strategic group literature base and the 
emerging theoretical and empirical literature of the Communication-lnformation 
Processing Model of Competitive Interaction were presented and discussed. From 
this discussion, testable hypotheses were developed in order to extend the theory 
by explaining how the strategic group concept is associated with key variables of 
the CIP model. The tests of the hypotheses regarding the influence of the 
strategic group construct on components of the Communication-lnformation 
Processing Model of Competitive Interaction reveal that there is a relationship 
between the similarity of strategic group membership of the actor and responder 
and certain response characteristics central to the CIP model.
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Competition--in the sense of organizations jockeying for resources, 
customers, markets and profits--is central to the discourse of business-related 
fields of inquiry, such as economics, marketing and strategic management. The 
field of strategic management has long been interested in competition among 
firms in an industry. Indeed, much of the theoretical underpinnings of the field 
suggest that firms select a domain in which to compete-i.e., choose a corporate- 
level strategy--and then pursue means through which to compete in the chosen 
domain--i.e., choose a business-level strategy (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; 
Bourgeois, 1980). The process of implementing and pursuing a business-level 
strategy gives rise to competition in the industry as each firm moves to secure 
resources and markets (Henderson, 1983), as well as to exploit opportunities and 
minimize threats (Spender, 1985).
Embedded in the search for competitive advantage, competitive 
interaction among firms in an industry is a fundamental, though generally 
implicit, element of strategic management. As a firm moves to pursue 
competitive advantage anticipated from its business-level strategy, so do others 
in the industry. This pursuit of competitive advantage results in competitive
Journal model used: Academy o f Management Journal.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2interaction, or rivalry, as firms attempt to enhance their competitive position in 
relation to each other vis a vis resources, capabilities, customers and revenues. 
Barney (1991) implies that firms can compete away the gains of competitive 
advantages that are not based on unique and inimitable resources. Rivals can 
take action to copy perceived advantages. The focus on competition in strategy 
research is readily apparent in articles concerning the pursuit and sustainability 
of a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993a; Porter, 1985;).
Despite the suggested importance of competitive interaction-rivalry--to 
the field, few studies have directly focused on the nature of interaction among 
firms in an industry (Bettis & Weeks, 1987; Chen, 1988; Smith, Grimm & 
Gannon, 1992; Peteraf, 1993, 1997). In answer to the call made by Caves 
(1984) to investigate the rivalrous moves among incumbent producers in an 
industry, this study investigates competitive interaction in a specific focal 
industry. This is accomplished through the application of the Communication- 
lnformation Processing (CIP) Model of Competitive Interaction.
The CIP model is based on communication-information processing theory. 
The model, developed by Smith and Grimm (1991), elaborated by Smith, Grimm, 
Gannon and Chen (1991) and applied primarily to large scale research in the 
U.S. airline industry (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992; Chen, et al., 1992; 1994, 
1995,) draws a parallel between the communication process (sender-message- 
receiver) and competitive interaction (acting firm-action-responding firms). The 
model and its ancillary propositions are currently under-tested. Large-scale
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3empirical tests have been conducted primarily in only one industry. This study 
serves to extend the generalizability of the model to a different industrial sector.
A facet of the CIP model that is currently underdeveloped is the influence 
of homophily--the degree of similarity-on key variables within the model. The 
degree of homophily between firms is a characteristic influenced by industry 
structure. Industry structure is one dimension of the competitive environment 
facing firms (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). The facet of industry structure that 
is the focus of this study is the level of homogeneity among firms in a focal 
industry (Aldrich, 1979; Cool & Schendel, 1988). This study investigates the 
influence of industry structure within the context of assessing competitive 
interaction in an industry by specifically assessing a firm's placement within the 
industry structure. The strategic group construct (Bogner & Thomas, 1994; 
McGee & Thomas, 1986; Porter, 1980) a construct within the industry structure 
paradigm of Industrial-Organization Economics and Strategic Management, 
captures the dimension of the competitive environment represented by 
homogeneity. Groups represent the structure of the industry and firms are 
positioned within a specific group (McGee & Thomas, 1986). The strategic 
groups in an industry are comprised of firms that are homogeneous along several 
product/market and resource attributes. This homogeneity begets homophily. 
Homophily, defined as a similarity among entities in a system, has been identified 
as both facilitating and inhibiting communication (Smith & Grimm, 1991).
The strategic group construct will be applied to the CIP model to 
determine the construct's influence on competitive interaction. Feigenbaum,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4McGee and Thomas (1986) propose that studies of strategic groups can 
contribute to an understanding of the strategic behavior of firms. The strategic 
group construct represents the structure of the competitive environment in which 
firms operate, and has had a central role in theory development and empirical 
inquiry in the Strategic Management field (Day, Lewin, & Hongyu, 1995; Peteraf 
& Shanley, 1997; Reger & Huff, 1993). Firms within groups share a similarity of 
assumptions about the potential of the industry (Porter, 1980). Firms in a group 
also have a similarity of goals and the skills/resources to achieve those goals 
(Caves & Porter, 1977). Strategic groups are relevant to the line of inquiry 
presented in this study as they are proposed in the literature to affect managers' 
information search behaviors and the decision-making process used in strategy 
formulation and implementation (Harrigan, 1985; Porac & Thomas, 1990). A 
firm's membership in a particular strategic group, therefore, should be a firm-level 
characteristic that should influence competitive interaction (Peteraf & Shanley, 
1997). As will be discussed in the review of literature, the strategic group 
construct is just beginning to be applied to questions of firm-level conduct and 
behavior (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1993, 1994; Bogner, Pandian, & Thomas, 
1994, Peteraf & Shanley 1997). In this study, the strategic group construct is 
expected to have some degree of influence on the competitive behavior of firms 
as captured by the CIP model.
Through the application of the theory of the CIP model of competitive 
interaction and the methodology developed by Chen (1988) to operationalize its 
constructs, several questions regarding the influence of the strategic group on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5competitive behavior are addressed. These questions are related to the nature 
of competition within and between groups, focusing on how firms in strategic 
groups interact. This type of inquiry is lacking in strategic group research 
(Baum & Korn, 1996). The research questions pursued in this study are: (1) do 
firms within strategic groups interact more intensively with each other or with 
firms from other groups; (2) does group membership affect the time it takes for 
firms to respond to a competitive move made by a firm in the industry; (3) does 
group membership influence whether a firm imitates a competitive move; (4) 
within the groups, can a hierarchical order of respondents be identified (i.e., is 
one firm in a group predominately "first" in formulating responses consistently 
followed by a sequence of other responding firms).
Through the pursuit of these questions this study makes several 
contributions to the emerging literature which investigates the CIP model. In 
addition to joining those few who have responded to the call made by Caves 
(1984) to investigate rivalrous moves (Chen, 1988; Peteraf, 1993b), this study 
responds to the challenge issued by Smith et al. (1992) and by Chen and 
Hambrick (1995) to extend the application of the research inspired by the CIP 
model of competition into other industrial sectors. Additionally, investigation of 
the influence of strategic groups on competitive interaction behaviors serves to 
probe the role that similarity between the actor and responder is expected to 
have in the CIP model. This is an aspect of the CIP model which has not been 
significantly addressed in previous research.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6The purpose of the current study, then, is to: (1) extend the application of 
the CIP model of competitive interaction to a different industrial domain from 
which it has been applied and subsequent theory developed, and (2) ascertain if 
strategic groups, as a proxy for homophily, influence components of the CIP 
model that can be characterized as manifestations of competitive behavior.
The remaining chapters proceed as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
model of competitive interaction and its development from communication theory, 
a summary of the empirical research on the CIP model, and a discussion of the 
strategic group literature. Chapter 3 presents the intersection of the 
Communication-lnformation Processing Model of Competitive Interaction with the 
theory base of the strategic groups literature. This intersection provides the 
basis of theory development for the hypotheses regarding the role of strategic 
groups in competitive interaction in an industry and the relationships that are 
expected to be observed among strategic groups in an industry. The 
methodology of the study is presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 the results of 
the study are presented and these results are discussed in Chapter 6.
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7CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW
This study draws upon the literature of two research streams within 
Strategic Management: the Communication-lnformation Processing (CIP) Model 
of Competitive Interaction and Strategic Group Theory. The CIP model of 
competitive interaction draws on the theory base of communication and 
information processing within organizations, strategic issues management, and 
environmental scanning. It views competition as an analogue of the 
communication process--a non-verbal signal sent to receivers (other firms in the 
industry) by means of a competitive action. A competitive action by a firm can 
take many forms, but the purpose is generally to secure resources, improve 
capabilities and/or acquire market share. The action can be implemented 
through such means a price increase, merger, expansion, long-term supply 
contract, or new product development. Competitive actions are an implicit 
component of strategy implementation. For example, in each of the business- 
level strategies identified by Porter—differentiation, cost leadership, or niche 
focus~it is expected that actions must be taken to implement the firm’s chosen 
strategy. Research regarding the CIP model and its application is comparatively 
new within Strategic Management research (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992).
In contrast, Strategic Group Theory (SGT)--the concept that there exists 
in each industry groupings of firms in that follows similar strategic patterns and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8positions (Bogner & Thomas, 1993; Cool & Dierickx, 1993)--is a mainstay within 
Strategic Management research. The strategic group is thought to have some 
influence on the conduct of firms in an industry and, hence, on performance. 
While this construct has been presented as framing a context for competition, 
there has been scant empirical investigation of its influence on competitive 
interaction (Peteraf, 1993b; Baum & Kom, 1996). The intersection of the CIP 
model of competitive interaction and Strategic Group Theory of the Strategic 
Management research base provides a fertile test-bed to further test the CIP 
model. Specifically, does the existence of strategic groups influence competitive 
interaction, as captured by the CIP model, in an industry? Although this may 
appear to be intuitively simplistic, the empirical research on strategic groups is 
unclear as to their influence on competitive interaction in an industry.
The next section presents the CIP model of competitive interaction and the 
supporting literature. The section following presents the relevant strategic group 
literature.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9THE COMMUNICATION-INFORMATION PROCESSING MODEL 
OF COMPETITIVE INTERACTION
This section presents and discusses the background and theoretical 
development of the CIP model of competitive interaction, the terms and 
constructs associated with it, and the empirical studies contributing to the model's 
development.
Background and Development of the CIP Model
The CIP model of competitive interaction, based on communication- 
information theory, was developed by Smith and Grimm (1991) and applied in 
empirical research, primarily in the U.S. airline industry, by Chen (1988), Smith, 
et. al (1989, 1991, 1992) and Chen and colleagues (1991, 1992, 1994, 1995). 
The core of the model is derived from the observed parallels of the 
communication-information process between sender and receiver and the 
competition process between firms (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). Since the 
model is drawn from communication-information processing theory, the model 
applies a communications perspective to explain and predict the behaviors 
evident in competitive interaction among firms in an industry.
The CIP model of competitive interaction was developed by the Strategic 
Management Research Group (SMRG) at the University of Maryland, consisting 
of Frank Paine, Martin Gannon, Ken Smith, and Curtis Grimm and their doctoral 
students. These researchers were attempting to identify a more dynamic 
conceptualization of strategy within the Strategic Management field. From their 
deliberations they realized that the use and application of information underlies 
the paradigm of the Strategic Management research base (Smith, Grimm,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Gannon & Chen, 1991; Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). For example, to be a 
cost leader the firm needs information on its costs, as well as information on its 
competitors' costs. To follow a niche strategy, the firm needs information on the 
current niches or the niches that can be created within an industry. It also needs 
information regarding competitors' intentions regarding these segments.
The concept of information as relevant to Strategic Management is not 
new (see, for example, Porter, 1980). The SMRG, however, went beyond the 
Porterian application of information, to specifically demonstrate that the 
competitive process, a manifestation of a firm's strategy, could be modeled by 
the communication-information process. While the role of information is not new 
to organization science, as is demonstrated and discussed in the next section, 
the application of a communication model to capture the dynamics of the 
competitive process between firms in an industry was a contribution that the 
SMRG made to the field.
Information in Organizational Science-Rationale for the Cl Model
The existence of a communication-information processing perspective has 
held central focus in organization science. Information is a necessary input to 
internal functions of the firm (Daft & Weick, 1984) such as planning and 
controlling (Bateman & Zeithamel, 1996), decision making (Schwenk, 1984), 
strategy formulation and implementation (Fahey & Narayanan, 1986), and 
organization structure and design, as well as coordination and control (Galbraith, 
1973). Information is also relevant to the external relationships that the firm has 
with other entities in its environment (Porter, 1980).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Several theories regarding how firms manage their relationship with their 
environment implicitly suggest the central importance of information. Resource 
Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), for example, focuses on the 
relevance of information regarding external entities that play a role in the flow of 
resources to the firm, and how this information influences how a firm chooses to 
interact with these entities. Strategic Information Theory (Dutton & 
Jackson,1987) relies on the information content of issues occurring in the firm's 
environment, and how this information can affect the firm, either positively (i.e., 
opportunity) or negatively (i.e., threat). Competitor analysis (Porter, 1980; 1985) 
also emphasizes the importance of information regarding competitors as a 
component of the strategy formulation process
In viewing the organization or firm as an information processing system 
(Daft & Weick, 1984), it is implied that the organization is comprised of structures 
and personnel which receive information regarding internal processes and 
external conditions and issues (Galbraith, 1973), interpret information, make 
conclusions as to the potential effect on the firm (Dutton & Jackson, 1987), and 
use information in decision-making processes regarding the firm’s alignment with 
its environment (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Powell, 1992). The use of 
information in this manner may result in actions implemented by the firm intended 
to alter the organization’s alignment with its environment. Figure 1 depicts the 
relationship between information, internal decision processes, and actions taken 
by the firm. Some actions are specifically targeted to exploit a firm's competitive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 1 
Relationship of Information, Internal Processes and Actions
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advantage and augment its position relative to other firms in the industry 
(Peteraf, 1993a; Baum & Korn, 1996). Both internal and external information 
have the potential to result in competitive actions through decision-making, 
strategy formulation and implementation, and organization structure and design. 
The resulting actions carry information to external entities (e.g., customers, 
investors and competing firms) which, in turn, use the information to provide data 
to their information-dependent organizational processes to formulate and 
implement a response (Smith & Grimm, 1992). For example, if the firm’s actions 
signal to a customer a price increase, the customer may attempt to negotiate a 
long-term supply contract to lock in favorable terms. Investors may bid up or 
discount a firm’s share value based on the “news” carried in the firm's action. A 
competitor may take a counter-action to nullify the advantage the acting firm was 
seeking from the action (Peteraf, 1993a).
From the perspective of the CIP model, competition, which is also termed 
competitive interaction in this literature base, is viewed as a dynamic information 
exchange process which can be depicted as given in Figure 2:
Figure 2
Competition: A Dynamic Information Exchange Process 
Action Information *  Response Information ^  Response
The competitive behaviors of the actors and responders of the process depicted 
in Figure 2 are influenced by factors that affect information exchange, such as,
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noise, structure and homophily (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1989; Smith & Grimm, 
1992). As a dynamic information exchange process, competition is a series of 
interactions motivated by the information content carried in a particular action, 
and the assessment of that information by the decision makers of the firms that 
have the potential to respond to the action (Smith, Grimm, Gannon & Chen, 
1989; Smith & Grimm, 1992).
Competitive Interaction and the CIP Model
Interactions among firms have been characterized as being either 
cooperative or competitive in nature (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991). The scope of 
the research stimulated by the CIP model focuses on competitive interactions: 
firms competing with other firms, through actions or responses to actions, in a 
specified domain for growth or survival (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). In this 
stream of research competitive interaction is defined as a dynamic process by 
which industry participants compete with each other through the undertaking of a 
series of competitive actions and responses to actions (Porter, 1980; Chen, 
1989). The stream of research stemming from the CIP model uses as its levei of 
analysis the competitive actions made by firms and the counteractions made in 
response to actions (Smith & Grimm, 1992; Baum & Korn, 1996). The action is 
viewed as the message being sent to receivers-other firms in the industry. An 
action taken by a firm, and the response it triggers, are defined as a competitive 
event which constitutes an interaction among firms.
The similarities between the communication-information process and the 
competitive interaction process form the core of the CIP model and are displayed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in Figure 3. In the model competition is viewed as a form of communication 
between parties. Smith and Grimm (1991) identify the basic components of the 
CIP model as the actor and the characteristics of the actor; the action and 
characteristics of the action; the responder and the characteristics of the 
responder; a communication channel connecting the actor and the responder; 
and, the competitive environment. The competitive environment introduces other 
information and noise into the system. Part of the information carried by the 
competitive environment is information on the structure of the industry (Smith & 
Grimm, 1992). This model has been applied primarily in empirical research on 
the U.S. airline industry.
According to the CIP model, information regarding competitive intent is 
communicated by the actions of firms in the industry and the response made to 
those actions. As can be seen in Figure 3, the action is viewed as the message, 
or signal, sent to receivers-other competitors in the industry. The "actor" is the 
source and sends a "message" to other firms via an "action." The "action" 
conveys information to other firms. The "receivers" are other firms in the industry 
and are potential “responders" to the message contained in the action. The 
message carries information content as to the intent of the acting firm vis a vis 
other firms in the industry, the degree of threat to the receiving firm(s), and the 
area of competitive focus of this action-specific aspect of the firm’s business-level 
strategy.
The "message" content of an action must pass through the "receiver’s" 
sense-making process (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992; Daft & Weick, 1984). In
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Figure 3
The Communication-lnformation Processing Model of Competitive Interactions
(Smith, Grimm, and Gannon, 1992)
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general terms, this process has been described in the literature as being 
performed by the upper echelon of an organization (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
The upper echelon is considered in practice and in the literature as monitoring 
the environment (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Daft, Sormunnen & Parks, 1989; 
Boyd & Fulk, 1995) and undertaking strategic decision making (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). The "receiver’s" decision makers assess the 
information content of the action. The "signal" from the acting firm, however, 
may not always be received by other firms.
Failure to receive the message occurs due either to noise in the system or 
lack of awareness of the action (Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992; Chen &, 
MacMillan, 1992). Just as in the communication process, if a message is not 
received, a response cannot be formulated. The model indicates that the 
responder must have a level of "awareness" of the action for the message to be 
received. Thus, a lack of awareness of an action is a determinant of non­
response to an action (Chen & MacMillan. 1992).
If a competing firm does receive the message, the sense-making process 
requires that the actor and action characteristics be assessed for information 
content. The receiving firm’s decision makers assess the message for the impact 
on the firm. The information content regarding: (1) who the actor is; (2) how the 
action alters the advantage of the acting firm, and (3) how the action affects the 
competitive advantage of the receiving firm is assessed. These potential effects 
are then considered in the upper echelon’s decision-making process (Henderson 
& Nutt, 1983) and a decision is made to act upon the information conveyed in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
action, or not. The “response" of the "responder" is further determined by the 
firm's motivation to respond and the firm's capability to respond (Chen & 
MacMillan, 1992).
If a response is made by a firm, the model identifies certain response 
characteristics. These response characteristics are also affected by motivation 
and capability (Chen & Miller, 1994). If a firm has the motivation to respond, but 
does not have the capability, the firm may not be able to respond. If it does 
respond, the time elapsed between the action and the response, termed 
response lag, will be longer than if the capabilities were in place. For example, a 
price cut by firm A may be viewed as a threat and an attempt by the actor to 
increase market share. Firms B and C are both aware and motivated to respond 
to preempt the action. Firm B assesses that it has the capability to sustain a 
price war and responds almost immediately. Firm C, however, lacks the 
capability and its response is delayed.
Terms and Definition of Constructs of the CIP Model
With the concepts of the CIP model presented, a summary of the terms 
and concepts of the model is in order. These terms and concepts are relevant to 
the dependent and independent variables that are presented in the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3 and the methodology presented in Chapter 4.
Actions and Actors. An action is defined as a specific and detectable 
competitive move. Actions convey messages regarding intent (e.g., acts to 
extend market share, alter capabilities, or change source of competitive 
advantage). Actors are those firms in the industry that undertake an action.
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Response and Responders. A response is a countermove, or counter­
action, made to a specific action by a specific actor. The responder is the firm 
undertaking a countermove or counteraction.
Actor and Responder Characteristics. These are characteristics of the 
firm that acts or responds to an action. The organizational characteristics of both 
the actor, such as size and reputation, and responder, such as strategic 
orientation and organizational slack, have been found to influence the response 
characteristics exhibited.
In viewing competitive interaction as a communication process, the 
characteristics of the actor and the characteristics of the action carry information 
content that must be interpreted by the receiver as it interprets the action and 
formulates the decision to respond (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). Both actor 
characteristics and responder characteristics were found to be determinants of 
response characteristics (Chen & MacMillan, 1992).
Response characteristics. There are several key dimensions to the 
response construct that have been analyzed in competitive interaction research. 
These are taken to reveal the response dynamics elicited by the characteristics 
of the actor, action, and responder. These key dimensions are:
Response lag - the delay between action and response.
Response likelihood - the ratio of responses made by a firm out of the 
number of opportunities a firm had to respond.
Number of responders - the total number of firms that actually respond to 
an action.
Response order- rank position based on response lag.
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Response imitation - the degree to which the response imitates the action.
The response characteristics and the actor/responder characteristics are 
the focus of the present study and are applicable to the research questions 
addressed in the present study. Their operationalization and measurement will 
be discussed separately in the methodology chapter.
Studies based on the CIP Model
The competitive interaction stream of research resulting from the 
application of the CIP model is a comparatively new area of research in the 
Strategic Management literature. As a result of its relative newness, there have 
been a modest number of empirical studies based on the CIP model. One of the 
earliest was a small-scale study based on interviews with top-level managers 
from high-tech industry firms (Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1990). However, the 
majority of the research articles published in this field are based on the empirical 
data in the U.S. airline industry which served as the basis for the pioneering 
dissertation by Chen (1983) on the CIP model.
In a study of high-tech electronics firms (Smith, Grimm, Chen and 
Gannon, 1989), the focus was on the response characteristic of response time, 
also referred to in this research as response lag. Organizational characteristics 
of the responder (i.e., responder characteristics) were tested for their association 
with response time. Some action characteristics were also tested for their 
association with response time. Response time, in turn, was tested for its 
association with organizational performance, as measured by sales growth.
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The responder characteristics indentified and tested for their relationship 
to response time were degree of formalization and strategic orientation (i.e., 
internal/external orientation as conceptualized by Miles and Snow, 1978). 
Degree of formalization, the extent to which an orgnization’s behavior is 
governed by rules and procedures, was not significantly correlated with response 
time. In assessing the firm's overall strategic orientation and the association with 
response time, the study found that the more externally oriented a firm, the lower 
the response time to an action. Conversely, the more internally oriented a firm, 
the higher its response time.
The action characteristics assessed in the study were the degree of 
perceived threat of the action and the perceived radicality of the action. The 
former was negatively associated with response time—the greater the threat, the 
lower the reponse time. The latter was positively asociated with response time; 
however, ‘radicality’ was poorly operationalized and measured in this study. The 
results also indicated support for the hypothesis that response time was 
negatively correlated with organizational performance.
In summation, the small-scale study of high-tech electronics firms tested 
the responder characteristics and action characteristics components of the CIP 
model for their influence on response time, as well as the relationship between 
response time and performance.
A series of research publications stemmed from Chen’s (1988) 
dissertation. The first study, Smith, Grimm, & Chen (1989) concentrated on 
action characeristics as predictors of response lag. This study was focused on
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how competitors interact in the marketplace via the ongoing exchange of 
competitive moves, with an emphasis on the action characteristics. The action 
characteristics associated with response lag were: (1) competitive impact; (2) 
attack intensity; (3) implementation requirement; and (4) type of action, whether 
strategic or tactical (It is interesting to note that of the 191 actions identified, 83% 
were tactical, such as price cuts). Each of the characteristics were were found to 
be salient predictors of response lag. From the findings regarding competitive 
impact and attack intensity, the authors drew the conclusion that the degree of 
threat represented in an action provided motivation to respond to an action. The 
authors further concluded that the study suggested that the awareness, 
motivation and capability of a potential responder determines its likelihood of 
responding.
The second study published from the empirical research on the CIP model 
in the U.S. airline industry focused on nonresponse and delayed response to 
actions (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). This research focused on two variables 
representing responder and action characteristics and the association with 
nonresponse or delayed response. The responder characteristic variable was 
defined as competitor dependence: the extent to which a competitor relies on
the markets affected by an action. The action characteristic studied was the 
irreversibility of the competitive move. This was assessed through the 
application of a questionnaire mailed to 430 senior airline executives. The 
results of the analyses indicated that the greater the competitor dependence a 
responder has with an actor, the lower the likelihood of non-response, while the
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greater the action irreversibility, the higher the likelihood of non-response. The 
study also demonstrated, contrary to the prediction of the hypothesis, that 
competitor dependence was positively related to response delay—the greater the 
dependence, the greater the response delay. In their conclusion, these authors 
posit lack of awareness as a possible determinant of non-response to an action.
The third study in this research stream relates action characeristics to 
response characteristics (Chen & Miller, 1994). The visibility of an action, and 
the centrality of the attack were positively associated with the number of 
responders answering a competitive action. The visibility of an attack 
operationalized the awareness construct of the CIP model. It was positively 
associated with the number of responses elicited by an action. The centrality of 
an attack captured the effect that a threatening action is expected to have in 
competitive interaction-threatening actions provoke response. In this study, the 
centrality of an attack was defined in the same way as competitor dependence in 
the previous study.
The fourth study in the research stream began to compare how categories 
of firms differ in their competitive behavior. Remaining within the domain of the 
U.S. airline industry, Chen and Hambrick (1995) compared the competitive 
behaviors of large and small firms observable through application of the CIP 
model. Small airlines were found to have greater propensity for action than the 
large firms in the study, faster action execution speed, and less action visibility. 
However, small firms were less responsive to competitive attacks and responded 
more slowly to actions than larger firms. In short, the study conducted by Chen
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and Hambrick examined how the competitive behaviors of small firms differed 
from larger firms.
In addition to refining the determinants and predictors of response 
characteristics, the studies conducted by Chen and colleagues conclude that 
awareness (of the action), motivation, and capability are attributes of the 
responder that influence response characteristics (Chen & MacMillan, 1992, 
Chen & Miller, 1994). The relevance of these responder characteristics is drawn 
directly from communication-information processing theory as well as social 
cognition (Keiser & Sproull, 1982). According to Smith, Grimm and Chen, 
(1989: p. 4 4 3 ):" .. .  competitors can offer responses to a competitive move only if 
they are aware of the move, are motivated to respond to the move, and if they 
are capable to responding to the move.1' If a responder is aware of a 
competitor’s action, the likelihood of a response is greater than if the responder is 
not aware. If the responder is motivated to respond, implying that the upper 
echelon of the responding firm interprets the information in the action either as a 
threat or a significant opportunity, the response likelihood is greater than if the 
firm is not motivated. Finally, the capability, in terms of assets, endowments and 
strategies (Smith & Grimm, 1991) of the responding firm, also influences the 
response characteristics. If the upper echelon assesses that it does not have the 
capability, in terms of resources, to respond, response likelihood is lower. If it 
does choose to mount a response, the time to respond is longer, as it takes time 
to acquire and deploy the resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993a; Cool & 
Dierickx, 1993) underlying a specific capability (Chen, et al., 1992, 1994).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
Although they contribute to the theoretical refinement of the model, the 
few empirical studies leave a gap in the investigation of the model and its 
application in explaining and predicting competitive interatction among firms in an 
industry. The theoretical presentation of the CIP model (Smith & Grimm, 1991) 
set forth five groups of propositions regarding the determinants of response lag. 
Each group of propositions, except one, has had components subjected to 
empirical research in the U.S. airline industry. The untested proposition from the 
theory underlying the CIP model regards the influence that homophily is 
expected to have on reponse lag. Homophily represents the degree of similarity 
between the actor and responder. Homophily represents both an actor and 
responder characteristic which is explicitly discussed in the theoretical 
development of the CIP model (Smith & Grimm, 1991), but which has not 
undergone empirical testing. The proposition developed by Smith and Grimm 
(1991) concerning homophily states that as similarity between actors and 
responders increases (e.g., their products or services are very similar) response 
lag will decrease.
At first blush it may appear that the study reported by Chen and 
MacMillan (1992) might begin to address the issue of homophily and its expected 
influence on the model. However, competitor dependence was defined from a 
responder’s perspective as the extent to which the responder relied on the 
markets affected by an action. Markets upon which a potential responder relies 
can come under attack from firms that are similar to or dissimilar from the 
potential responder (Porter, 1980). Therefore, the measure of the competitor
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dependence variable does not fully operationalize the homophily construct. On 
the other hand, if we were to take competitor dependence as a valid 
operationalization of homophily, what are we to make of the finding from Chen 
and MacMillan's (1992) study which is contrary to Smith and Grimm's (1991) 
proposition regarding homophily? A more focused operationalization of 
homophily could possibly result in support for the relationship proposed by Simth 
and Grimm (1991). If it does not, then the role of homophily would be reduced to 
zero in the CIP model.
In summation, the studies to date that utilize the CIP model as their point 
of departure to explain and predict competitive behavior and competitive 
interaction have not addressed the role of homophily. If homophily is central to 
the model, if it represents an important construct capturing both actor and 
responder characteristics, and if it is expected to have an influence on response 
characteristics, it should be tested. The present study addresses the gap in the 
extant literature on the CIP model by attempting to provide empirical support for 
the proposition that homophily influences response lag and investigates the 
influence that homohily may have on other response characteristics, such as 
response likelihood and response matching.
The basis for the current study is the intersection of the theoretical 
concepts of the CIP model and those of the Strategic Groups literature base. 
Before presenting the rationale for investigating this intersection, the following 
section presents and discusses the theoretical and empirical foundation of the 
Strategic Groups construct.
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STRATEGIC GROUPS 
Industry structure has long been posited as a constraint on competition 
within an industry (Bain, 1956; Porter, 1980; Cool & Schendel, 1988; Boeker, 
1991). One aspect of industry structure--the strategic group--was identified by 
Hunt (1972) as groups of firms using differentiated means to compete in an 
industry. Hunt found that firms within a strategic group were similar in the 
strategies used to compete, and that several strategic groups could exist within a 
single industry. This construct has been applied to research in both the 
Industrial/Organizational (I/O) Economics and the Strategic Management 
streams of research (Bogner, et al., 1994) and has been the basis for several 
theoretical and empirical studies (Day, et al., 1995; Tang & Thomas, 1992). 
Strategic group research has been conducted to describe the structure of a 
number of industries (Day, et al., 1995).
A strategic group is a group of firms in an industry that are similar along 
key strategic attributes (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1990; 1993; Cool & Dierickx,
1993), having made similar decisions in key areas (Porter, 1980). Firms within a 
group are more similar to one another along stated strategic dimensions than to 
firms from other groups; firms from different groups are asymmetric along the 
strategic dimensions of interest. The strategic dimensions generally used to 
assess symmetry/asymmetry represent product/market scope and resource 
bundles (Cool & Schendel, 1988; Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1993). Differences in 
these strategic dimensions are taken to result from upper echelon discretion in 
domain selection, domain navigation, and resource allocation (Bogner, et al.,
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1994). As such, a firm’s profile along strategic dimensions is a result of a 
strategic decision-making process within the firm.
Strategic groups have been presented in the literature as having an 
influence on the flow and interpretation of information among firms in an industry 
(Harrigan, 1985). The outcome of this differentiated flow of information resulting 
from strategic group structures is not clear from the strategic group literature. 
Some indicate that this flow results in a greater opportunity for collusory behavior 
(Porter 1980; 1985; Harrigan, 1985), resulting in reduced competitive interaction 
between firms within groups. Others state that this flow of information and its 
interpretability should result in greater levels of competitive interaction, hence 
rivalry, within strategic groups (Cool & Dierickx, 1993).
Empirical research seems to confirm the existence of strategic groups 
(Tang & Thomas, 1992). Strategic groups have been found to exist in several 
different industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry (Cool & Schendel, 
1988), the insurance industry (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1990) the global 
automotive industry (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991) and the global computer 
industry (Duysters & Hagedoom, 1995). Day (1995), in a recent review of 
strategic groups research, provides a list of 45 research articles focusing on 
strategic groups in 18 different industries over the period 1972 to 1993. Several 
theoretical perspectives have been used to argue the existence of groupings 
within an industry.
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Theoretical Perspectives
There are four primary theoretical perspectives upon which the argument 
for the existence of strategic groups has been founded. First, groups may 
develop from strategic choices made firms in their risk posture, skill development 
and asset investment, with firms making similar strategic choices clustered in the 
same competitive space (Cool, 1985). Second, Caves and Porter (1979) 
suggest that the emergence of group structures depends on whether firms 
choose to respond to competitors’ strategic initiatives in a systematically different 
manner (Tang & Thomas, 1993). If there is a systematic difference, a group 
structure emerges in the industry. In a study of 50 manufacturing industries, 
Hergert, 1987, found that the number of strategic groups ranged from one (i.e., 
no systematically differential reaction to strategic initiatives) to six (i.e., at least 
six different competitive positions within the industry, with differing profiles on 
specific strategic initiatives including advertising, R&D ratio, and number of 
customer segments served). The mode for the number of strategic groups in 
Hergert’s study was four groups in 24 industries.
The third theoretical rationale for the existence of strategic groups holds 
that previous investments in resources and technology may lead to the creation 
of strategic groups. Firms which have made previous investments in technology 
may not be able to shift to new technology due to the costs involved, creating 
groupings based on available technology and the available options with which to 
deploy that technology (Tang & Thomas, 1994). Recent work by Cool and 
Dierickx (1993) has focused on resource stocks and resource flows as a
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differentiating factor in strategic group evolution and argues that strategic group 
membership is a function of past investments in assets.
Recently, the concept of spatial competition has been put forth as a 
theoretical explanation of strategic groups. Based on the principles of minimum 
differentiation (Hotelling, 1929) and local clustering (Easton & Lipsey, 1975), the 
spatial competition argument proposes that product attributes of competing firms 
tend to be similar. According to Tang and Thomas (1992:325),
the dimensions of product space can be viewed as the strategic 
dimensions along which firms choose to compete. With this 
extension, the principle of local clustering provides the theoretical 
foundation for the existence of strategic group formation based 
upon strategic dimensions.
Although not directly cited by Tang and Thomas, one can draw a parallel 
between their theoretical justification of strategic groups and Hergert’s earlier 
findings. In industries where Hergert (1987) found only one industry-inclusive 
strategic group, the influence of spatial competition and local clustering could be 
argued to have been minimal. In industries where Hergert found multiple 
groups, the influence of spatial competition and local clustering could be posited 
as having been stronger. This interpretation is consistent with the theories 
developed by Hotelling (1929) and Easton and Lipsey (1975), which Tang and 
Thomas applied as justification for the emergence of strategic groups in an 
industry.
Another recent development in strategic group research has been the 
application of cognitive taxonomy as a theoretical justification for the existence
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of strategic groups in an industry (Bogner & Thomas, 1993; Peteraf & Shanley, 
1997; Porac et al, 1987; Reger & Huff , 1993). Adherents to this argument for 
the existence of strategic groups suggest that cognitive taxonomies result from 
the implicit classification schemes of the competitive environment used by the 
upper echelon within a firm and that these schemes cluster firms into groups 
according to similarities. The cognitive taxonomy provides a mental model of the 
competitive environment and provides a means to “frame a conceptual structure 
of [the] competitive environment in order to monitor the environment and 
formulate strategy” and to focalize environmental scanning (Tang & Thomas, 
1992:326).
Bogner and Thomas (1993) suggest that this conceptual structure of the 
competitive environment influences the sense-making process and strategic 
choice. Cognitive classification schemes provide a summary of the competitive 
environment and act as reference points for strategic choice and competition. 
Because these mental models result from decision makers’ assessment of 
similarity of their firm to other firms in the industry (Porac, et al, 1987; Huff & 
Reger, 1992) and these mental models influence strategic choice, Tang and 
Thomas (1993) propose that “mental models of competition in an industry 
determine the strategic group structure of that industry, and firms in the same 
group will be considered stronger competitors" (1992:327).
Bogner and Thomas (1993) synthesize the Industrial/Organization (I/O) 
roots of strategic group theory with the organizational behavior (OB) origins of 
cognitive taxonomy in order to develop a model which indicates that the
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economic and objective strategic groups (i.e., the I/O concept of groups as a 
facet of industry structure) influence the cognitive groupings perceived by the 
firms' decision makers (i.e., the OB perspective of groups as a result of an 
enacted cognitive process). Enacting the perceived environment leads to actions 
that serve either to reinforce or alter the strategic grouping. Thus, we observe in 
an industry time periods with a stable group structure and other time periods with 
change and transition to a new strategic group structure. The model developed 
by Bogner and Thomas (1993) links the objective environment with the perceived 
environment to explain the link between strategic groups and strategy 
formulation.
Empirical Findings
Empirical strategic group research has focused predominantly on three 
major themes: (1) the relationship between strategic groups and performance; (2) 
the derivation of strategic groups; and (3) the stability of the strategic group 
structure over time. Each of these will be discussed in order.
Relationship between strategic groups and performance. This has 
been a central theme in strategic group research (Cool & Schendel, 1988; 
McGee & Thomas, 1986; Thomas & Venkatramen, 1989; Bogner, et al., 1994). 
Within the I/O economics tradition of organizational research, the emphasis on 
strategic groups has been to relate performance to group membership (Porter, 
1980; Cool & Schendel, 1988). Several studies have been undertaken in this 
vein, with equivocal findings. While some studies have found support for the 
existence of a strategic group-performance relationship, the existence of a direct
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link between group membership and firm profitability appears questionable (Cool 
& Dierickx, 1993) and the predictive validity of strategic groups in terms of 
performance has been weak. The lack of agreement in findings on the predictive 
validity of the strategic group construct for performance is troublesome, given the 
origination of the concept in the structure conduct performance  
paradigm reflecting the I/O economics influence of strategy research. The lack of 
any definitive finding regarding the relationship between group membership and 
performance leads one to ask if the strategic group construct has any predictive 
validity on the conduct of firms within an identified grouping.
The derivation of strategic groups. This area of research has focused 
on how groups in an industry are identified; the variables used as proxies for 
strategic decisions (i.e., areas of firm behavior influenced by managerial choice) 
representing product and market scope, and resource allocation; and the 
statistical method used to determine the underlying groupings from the pattern of 
product/market scope variables and resource allocation variables. Recent 
research has focused on the product/market scope and resource allocation areas 
of strategy content as the basis of identifying grouping variables (Cool, 1985; 
Deams & Thomas, 1994). The method predominately used to identify groups 
has been cluster analysis (Barney & Hoskisson, 1990; Harrigan, 1985), though 
factor analysis and multi-dimensional scaling have also been used.
Stability of the strategic group structure over time. Cool and 
Schendel (1988), studying a 20-year period in the pharmaceutical industry, 
presented the first substantiation that strategic groups are a “relatively stable
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phenomena" (1988:1120). This finding was also supported by subsequent 
research. In a study of the U.S. insurance industry Feigenbaum and Thomas 
(1990) found that most firms belonged to the same strategic group over the 20- 
year period of their study. Low firm mobility between groups was also observed 
in the offshore drilling industry, with only two of 679 firms changing strategic 
groupings (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989). Consistent with previous studies, 
Bogner et al. (1994) found that few firms actually change groups.
Conduct Within Strategic Groups
Few studies of strategic groups have directly addressed the issue of the 
competitive patterns of firms within strategic groups. When the concept of a 
change in competitive patterns has been addressed (Cool, 1985, for example), it 
has been discussed in terms of the entire group moving to different dimensions 
of strategic space as defined by the product/market scope and resource 
deployment variables. Given how groups have been identified, this type of 
change in competitive pattern addresses only how strategies used to compete 
have changed at the group level; it does not address whether or not the group 
structure influences the interaction of firms within or between groups.
Recent work in competitive interaction has only just begun to address the 
potential influence that strategic groups may have on competitive action and 
response patterns (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). The study by Chen and Hambrick, 
however, looked only at the impact of firm size on competitive interaction. In this 
study these researchers found that smaller firms took longer to respond to the 
actions of larger firms, presumably due to differences in capabilities. Although
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size has been used as a single variable to identify strategic groups in previous 
studies (Porter, 1979), scholars studying strategic groups advocate a multi­
variate approach to capture the multi-dimensional nature of strategic decision 
making carried out in firms regarding product/market scope, resource allocation, 
and process technology (Cool & Schendel, 1988; Thomas & Venkatramen, 1989; 
Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Daems & Thomas, 1994; Harrigan, 1985). 
Strategic group research has evolved beyond considering just size alone as 
representative of strategic decisions made by the management of firms in an 
industry.
While the strategic group construct has been criticized as being an 
analytical artifact (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Hatten & Hatten, 1987), if it does 
reflect a theoretical construct as others suggest (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1987; 
1994; McGee & Thomas, 1986; Tang & Thomas, 1995), then we would expect to 
see this construct bear an influence on the conduct of firms within groups. 
Competitive behavior, as a manifestation of the patterns of intended or emergent 
strategies arising from the upper echelon’s strategic decision process, is conduct 
at the firm level (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). It is this conduct and the 
information contained therein that is being communicated to other firms in the 
industry, and captured by the CIP model of competitive interaction. This firm- 
level conduct may well indeed be influenced by the existence of strategic groups 
in the industry.
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SUMMARY
A newly developed model within Strategic Management research 
proposes that the process of competitive interaction is analogous to the 
communication-information process. The model equates components of the 
communication process with components of the competitive interaction process. 
A facet of the model which has undergone limited investigation is the influence 
that similarity between the sender and receiver is expected to have on 
competitive interaction when characterized as a communication process. This 
similarity is presented in communication theory as homophily and in the CIP 
model as a characteristic of the actor, the receiver, and the competitive 
environment.
The strategic group provides a valuable construct through which to 
analyze and understand competitive behavior (Tang & Thomas, 1992; McGee & 
Thomas, 1986; Thomas & Venkatramen, 1989). Strategic groups represent 
groupings of firms that have made similar resource investments, have similar 
product/market scope, and a similar conceptualization of the competitive 
environment.
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
The framework provided by the CIP model presented in the previous 
chapter allows the constructs of communication-information processing theory 
that may result in increased or decreased interaction between entities to be 
applied to the analysis of competition. From this jumping-off point, this chapter 
presents the intersection of the two research streams presented in Chapter 2. 
This chapter also articulates a theoretical rationale for the effect of strategic 
groups within an industry on competitive interaction.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
INTERSECTION OF THE COMMUNICATION-INFORMATION 
PROCESSING MODEL OF COMPETITIVE INTERACTION AND 
STRATEGIC GROUPS
The CIP model allows the constructs of communication theory to be 
applied to the analysis of competition. In order to do this, constructs from 
organizational and industrial research must be identified that can be used as 
proxies for parallel constructs in communication-information processing theory. 
This section presents the homophily construct from communication theory and 
the strategic group construct from I/O Economics as parallel constructs.
As previously discussed, when an action takes place, the characteristics 
of the actor and a potential responder to an action have been found to influence 
the likelihood of a response, the time to respond, and other response 
characteristics. The specific characteristic of both the actor and responder that is 
of interest in this study is the homophily between the actor and responders. In 
communication theory homophily is a characteristic that describes the similarity 
between the source (the actor) and the receiver (the responder). In their 
presentation of the theoretical underpinnings of the CIP model of competitive 
interaction, Smith and Grimm (1991) propose that homophily should influence the 
dynamics of interaction. This construct enters the model given in Figure 2 as a 
characteristic of both the sender and the receiver. Smith and Grimm (1991) state 
that the proposition that more effective communication occurs when the source 
and receiver are homophilous (i.e., similar) is an important one in the 
communication literature. They go on to state that “the concept of homophily is 
used here to describe the degree to which pairs of competitors are alike in terms
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of specific assets, unique capabilities and endowments, as well as products, 
markets, and strategies" (Smith & Grimm, 1991:11). The degree of homophily 
between the actor and the responder is expected to influence the communication 
process and influence response characteristics.
The concept of homophily is also introduced in the model through the 
competitive environment. Smith, Grimm and Gannon (1992:123) clarify this point 
by stating that "one of the key dimensions by which industries and their 
structures may vary include homogeneity, or the similarity of competitors in terms 
of size, resources, strategies, and costs (Aldrich, 1979; Gollop & Roberts, 1979; 
Hannan & Freeman, 1977)." The structures in the industry resulting from 
homogeneity give rise to the homophily between entities within the structure.
Because the firm-level characteristic of homophily arises from the 
industry-level characteristic of homogeneity, the homophily between the actor 
and responder should be captured by the strategic group construct. Firms within 
a strategic group share a level of interdependence, due to similarities in strategic 
capabilities (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1993) and in product and market scope 
(Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Cool and Dierickx, 1993). A market has been 
defined as being a tangible, inter-related set of mutually aware firms that act 
based on the observed actions of others, summarized through a feedback 
process (White, 1981). Strategic group theory proposes that the industry is 
structured into subsets of competitors based on similarity in product, market, 
processes and customers, and that these groupings frame conduct, behavior, 
decision-making and competition within the industry (Porac & Thomas, 1990;
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Porac, et al., 1994; Bogner & Thomas, 1994; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Due to 
these similarities, firms within the same strategic group represent homophilous 
entities within the communication framework. The strategic group construct of 
Strategic Management and I/O Economics should serve as a proxy for the 
homophily construct of communication theory.
This apparent equivalence between the homophily concept of 
communication theory and the strategic group construct of the I/O literature base 
directly addresses the primary research question of whether the existence of 
strategic groups in an industry affects competitive interaction in that industry. 
Homophily is proposed to influence response characteristics. The argument has 
been presented that the strategic group construct is an equivalent to homophily. 
Casting this assessment of strategic groups in terms of the CIP model of 
competitive interaction yields the proposition that the existence of strategic 
groups in an industry should influence competitive interaction and response 
characteristics as operationalized through the CIP model. Due to homophily and 
the resulting experience in communicating with similar entities, firms within a 
strategic group may have greater expertise in dealing with one another and 
therefore a greater source of accumulated knowledge in the upper echelon to 
interpret the intentions of actions taken by group members (Harrigan, 1985; Heil 
& Robertson, 1991).
The existence of strategic groups in an industry and a firm's membership 
within a group should influence competitive interaction (Caves & Porter, 1979; 
Cool & Dierickx, 1993; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). The strategic group represents
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the structure within an industry--the context within which competitive interaction 
occurs (Bain, 1959; Hunt, 1972; Newman, 1973). Inclusion of a firm in a 
strategic group affects the firm’s strategic posture and constrains its freedom of 
action (Pitt & Thomas, 1994). While there is a basic understanding of what 
strategic groups are, there are conflicting views on how the existence of strategic 
groups affects the conduct of firms within them. For example, part of the appeal 
of the strategic group construct is that it captures the intuitive notion that rivalry 
differs within a group and between groups (Cool & Diereckx, 1993). This intuitive 
notion, however, does not indicate if firms within groups are more intensely 
competitive (i.e., exhibit greater competitive interaction) with each other than with 
firms outside the group. The strategic group literature has not clearly addressed 
the issue of the directionality of rivalry among firms within and between groups.
Porter (1980) suggests that within-group rivalry is moderate and 
accommodative: firms in a group generally tolerate each other. Because of the 
similarity among firms in a group, firms resemble one another closely and 
recognize their mutual dependence. Recognition of this mutual dependence 
gives rise to oligopolistic behavior, limiting within-group competition and 
enhancing between-group competition (Caves & Porter, 1988). On the other 
hand, Henderson (1983:8) states that "the more similar competitors are to each 
other, the more severe their competition." Since groups represent firms 
homogeneous (i.e., similar) along several strategic dimensions, the inference is 
that competition (i.e., rivalry) is stronger between firms in the same group, than 
between firms from different groups.
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The recognition of mutual interdependence within groups is proposed to 
influence the flow of communication within the group (Harrigan, 1985). Heil and 
Robertson (1991) emphasize the influence of similarity on competition, noting 
that competitors which are similar in their strategies and structures monitor each 
other most closely and are most able to interpret competitive signals. Pitt and 
Thomas (1994:85) state that, because groups represent structure, "firms in a 
group share a common set of products, technologies, customers, and distribution 
channels, yielding a zero-sum game competition and, thus, intense within-group 
rivalry." The question of the directionality of rivalry represents, in part, the nature 
of competitive interaction within an industry.
The lack of a clear perspective on rivalry within and between groups is 
also evidenced with regard to strategic distance. Cool and Diereckx (1993) build 
an argument that between-group rivalry is greater than within-group rivalry. This 
position on rivalry is also based on the proposition that group members recognize 
their mutual interdependence, an argument couched in the expected oligopolistic 
behavior of firms within groups (Porter, 1980). However, Cool and Diereckx 
(1993) draw upon the same literature base to suggest that increasing strategic 
distance, operationalized as decreasing similarity, “would lead to more 
competition between strategic groups" (1993:49). However, Hergert (1987) 
found statistically weak support for the opposite of Cool and Dierickx's 
proposition: as strategic distance decreased, between-group rivalry increased. 
Caves and Porter (1977) and Porter (1976, 1979) put forth the argument that
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interaction is greater inter-group than intra-group, a position which even Porter 
(1980) later reverses.
Aside from being the results of aggregate strategic and economic 
decisions (Bogner & Thomas, 1993), strategic groups represent a cognitive 
framework that competitors apply to their environment (Porac & Thomas, 1990; 
Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Reger & Huff, 1993). This cognitive 
framework provides a cognitive schema for perceiving and understanding the 
competitive environment, assessing cues, and comparing conduct (Feigenbaum, 
Hart & Schendel, 1993). The perceptions of strategic group structure are widely 
shared by industry participants (Reger & Huff, 1993; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). 
The existence of stable strategic groups over a period of time gives rise to 
institutional forces (Dimaggio &Powell, 1983) that serve to forge a strategic group 
identity of firms within groups (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Accordingly, strategic 
groups are manifestations of the ways in which strategists organize and interpret 
their environment. As such, they are structures which should influence the 
enactment processes (Weick, 1979) that strategists use in making decisions to 
guide their firms and navigate the competitive domain.
At the firm level, theories of inter-firm competition agree that the greater 
the degree of overlap between a firm's market domain and that of others, the 
greater the intensity of competition the focal firm experiences (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977; Porter, 1980; Scherer & Ross, 1990). Research directly 
examining the patterns of rivalry between firms within and across strategic 
groups is limited (Barnett, 1993; Cool & Dierickx, 1993; Peteraf, 1994). However,
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if one considers the determinants of competitive response (awareness, 
capabilities, and motivation) as presented in the Communication-lnformation 
Processing Model of Competitive Interaction, one might deduce that the 
existence of a group structure would influence competitive interaction to be 
greater within groups than between groups. The question of whether the 
existence of strategic groupings influence which firms interact more strongly- 
firms within groups or firms across groups-remains a fertile area for 
investigation.
The emphasis in the literature placed on the similarity of firms within 
strategic groups and the dissimilarity of firms across strategic groups addresses 
the role homophily is expected to have in the CIP model of competitive 
interaction previously discussed. The stability of groups over time indicates that 
the homophily of firms in a group provides a long-term context within which to 
interpret signals and frame strategic decision cycles. Firms within these 
symmetric, homophilous groupings should have similar resource capabilities 
(Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991), an awareness of firms within their own groupings 
(Porac, et al. 1994; Spender, 1988), experience in interpreting signals from firms 
in their own grouping (Porter, 1980; Harrigan, 1985), and a motivation to respond 
quickly to firms within their own grouping, due to the similarities of resource and 
market scope (Chen, 1996). Chen and colleagues (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; 
Chen & Miller, 1994) concluded that the factors of awareness, capabilities and 
motivation would be expected to influence the response characteristics of 
response lag, likelihood of response, response imitation, and the number of
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responders. Although not explicitly stated in the theoretical development of the 
CIP model, it can be deduced that homophily influences response characteristics 
through its influence on awareness, motivation and capability. As a parallel 
construct, the strategic group should also affect response characteristics through 
the same avenues; Figure 4 outlines these relationships.
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CAPABILITIES, AWARENESS AND MOTIVATION 
IN STRATEGIC GROUPS
The model of competitive interaction emphasizes the role that capabilities, 
awareness and motivation have in shaping the response dynamics between 
firms. Strategic group theory emphasizes the similarity in capabilities among 
firms in strategic groups, the level of mutual awareness, and the motivation that 
firms may have to engage in rivalrous behavior. The following section discusses 
the theory and empirical findings of strategic group research in the areas of 
capabilities, awareness and motivation, leading to the development of 
hypotheses regarding how the concept of strategic groups may influence 
competitive interaction and response dynamics through the construct's influence 
on capabilities, awareness, and motivation.
Capabilities
Strategic group theory hypothesizes that firms are homogeneous within 
strategic groups and heterogeneous between groups. This homogeneity implies 
a similarity of capabilities among firms within a strategic group (Noria & Garcia- 
Pont, 1991). Movement from one group to another group is described as being 
constrained by the presence of mobility barriers and by past resource 
investment/allocation decisions made by the firm. These investment allocation 
decisions give rise to capabilities (Ghemawatt, 1990; Barney, 1991).
Mobility barriers are structural factors that protect successful firms from 
invasions by adjacent competitors, delineate boundaries between strategic 
groups (Caves & Porter, 1977; Harrigan, 1985), and impede firms from freely 
changing their competitive position (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989). Viewed as a
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within-industry analogue to entry and exit barriers, mobility barriers inhibit 
incursion from outside firms. They make entry into a strategic group costly, due 
to the different strategic profiles and resource endowments upon which 
competition in the group is based and the investments made to erect these 
barriers (Caves & Porter, 1979).
Cool and Schendel (1987) suggest that mobility barriers contribute to the 
observed stability in the configuration of strategic groups in an industry. Due to 
mobility barriers, the same firms are incumbents of the same group for an 
extended period of time. The stability of group membership ranged from five to 
seven years in their 20-year study of the pharmaceutical industry. Mobility 
barriers deter movement between groups because of substantial cost, significant 
lapse of time for a firm to alter its strategic profile, or uncertainty about outcomes 
(McGee & Thomas, 1986).
Mascarenhas and Aaker (1989) propose that mobility barriers are derived 
from skills and assets-again an implication of the differing capabilities between 
groupings of firms. Firms in group A are separated from firms in group B by 
different skills and assets, or capabilities. If a firm would like to enter a strategic 
group the “key consideration usually is whether the necessary skills and assets 
exist or can be developed" (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989:476). Skills and assets 
represent the resources upon which capabilities are based (Barney, 1991). 
Thus, firms from one group may not have the necessary skills or assets to 
compete (i.e., respond to an action) with a firm from another strategic group. If 
they do respond, the response may be delayed due to the time required to
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develop the capabilities (i.e., acquire or develop the skills and assets) 
neccessary to respond to an action.
Past resource investment and allocation decisions yield groupings of firms 
which are similar in resource bundles within groups, yet dissimilar in resource 
bundles across groups (Cool, Diereckx & Marten, 1994). Prior investment 
decisions undertaken by firms affect the range of decisions that can be 
undertaken to meet challenges and threats facing the firm (Ghemawat, 1990). 
Past investment limits present resources to bring to play in current competitive 
situations. Since firms derive their capabilities from their resources, according to 
the resource-based view of competitive strategy (Barney, 1991), a firm’s 
resource profile should affect its capabilities in responding to an action. It should 
be expected that firms would respond differentially to actions initiated from within 
the group than to those actions initiated outside the group, as differences in 
capabilities differentiate among responders to actions (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; 
Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). This presentation on capabilities suggests that 
capabilities are similar within group. It also suggests that differences in 
capabilities between groups may make it more difficult for firms to respond to out­
group actions, while facilitating the interpretation of an action and the response to 
an in-group firm. Therefore, the strategic group should have an influence on the 
response characteristics of the CIP model, due to its expected influence on 
capabilities.
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Awareness
The first step in the formulation of competitive strategy is the identification 
of the firm’s major competitors (Porter, 1980). The definitional issue of identifying 
competitors revolves around interpreting cues from the competitive environment. 
Porac and Thomas (1990) suggest that cue interpretation involves an 
assessment about the technological similarity and/or product/market similarity. 
This reference to ‘similarity’ along product/market dimensions suggests that firms 
within the same strategic grouping should be more aware of the competitive cues 
of group member firms than of firms from other groups (Heil & Robertson, 1990).
In the assessment of the competitive environment, the information 
selected, interpreted and analyzed by decision makers may be influenced by 
biases--blind spots--"where a competitor will either not see (i.e., be aware of) the 
significance of events . . . will perceive them incorrectly, or will perceive them 
slowly" (Porter, 1980:59). These biases result from structural factors (Zajac & 
Bazerman, 1991) such as firms not competing in the same strategic space due to 
difference in product scope, market scope, resource asymmetries, or from the 
cognitive schema the decision makers apply to make sense of the competitive 
environment (Porac, Thomas & Emme, 1994; Porac & Thomas, 1993).
Huff and Reger (1993) suggest that strategists within an organization 
readily perceive strategic groups within their industry. They further contend that 
these groups provide a means of organizing and making sense of their 
competitive environment. Caves and Porter (1977) state that firms in a strategic 
group are aware of their mutual interdependence. Research conducted by
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Feigenbaum and Thomas (1990) suggests that firms in the same strategic 
groups are more aware of the actions and behaviors of groups members than 
non-group members and focus on the behaviors of firms within the same 
strategic group when making competitive strategy decisions. These researchers 
have confirmed that the strategic group acts as a reference group. Members use 
the groups as normative and comparative benchmarks and adjust strategic 
behavior accordingly. This suggests that firms within groups have a higher level 
of awareness of each other than of firms in different groups. In terms of the CIP 
model, firms in the same group should be more aware of actions taken by group 
members than of actions taken by outside, non-group member firms. This 
awareness influences the observed response characteristics to competitive 
actions (Chen, et al., 1994).
The influence of strategic groups on the decision makers' cognitive 
understanding of their competitive environments is further discussed by Bogner 
and Thomas (1993). They suggest that objective strategic groupings drive the 
cognitive strategic groupings that decision makers form of their industry and their 
place in it. During periods of group stability, the objective structural context 
influences decision makers' cognitive assessments of the competitive 
environment. Because of these cognitive assessments, decision makers, during 
period of group stability, may be more aware of the actions of and interactions 
among firms in their own group. Hence, it is these cues from within the group 
that are noticed, interpreted for meaning, and acted upon (Porac, et al., 1994; 
Heil and Robertson, 1991).
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Firms within a strategic group should be more likely to be aware of actions 
taken by other group members and respond to those actions. Evidence suggests 
that actors acknowledge, at least implicitly, their firm’s membership in groups; 
this appears to constrain firms’ future conduct (Cool, 1985; Cool & Schendel, 
1988; Harrigan, 1985). Due to cognitive simplification (Schwenk, 1980), decision 
makers will be more aware of the actions of the firms that are recognized as 
similar, and act accordingly (Reger & Huff, 1993). Porter (1980) has suggested 
that firms in the same strategic group should recognize (i.e., be aware of) each 
other as close competitors and that firms in different strategic groups are less 
closely competitive. It should be expected that firms would respond differentially 
to actions initiated from within the group than those actions initiated outside the 
group due to the hypothesized influence that strategic group membership has on 
a firm’s attention to and awareness of actions of other firms in the same strategic 
group.
Motivation
Firms undertake actions to capitalize on an opportunity, or minimize a 
threat to their competitive position. Firms may be prompted to respond to the 
actions of others by the observation that the latter have higher performance 
levels in terms of market dominance (Cool & Schendel, 1988). Performance is 
based on the competitive advantage of the firm, with the strategic capabilities of 
the firm being the fundamental source of competitive advantage (Teece, 1988). 
Each strategic group has a distinctive source of competitive advantage that 
cannot be easily acquired or imitated by firms in other groups (Nohria & Garcia-
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Pont, 1991). Because competitive advantage is a factor contributing to 
performance, firms are motivated to protect their sources of advantage (Petraf, 
1990). An action taken by a group-member firm that utilizes a resource or 
capability in a manner which returns greater rents is a direct threat to other firms 
in the same group, and those firms would be motivated to respond to share in the 
gains anticipated from an action (Feigenbaum & Thomas; 1990).
Motivation to respond to actions of group-member firms also arises from 
the product/market scope similarities within groups (Chen, 1996). An action 
taken on either the product or market dimension could be interpreted as a threat 
to the positions of other firms within the group. The likelihood of response is 
greater under conditions of perceived threat (Chen & MacMillan, 1992). The 
actions taken by a group-member firm may be more readily interpreted as a 
threat than the actions taken by a non-group-member firm (Porac, et al. 1994; 
Harrigan, 1985; Heil & Robertson, 1991). It should be expected that firms would 
respond differentially to actions initiated from within the group than those actions 
initiated outside the group due to the hypothesized influence that strategic group 
membership has on a firm’s motivation to reap rents from its resource 
investments and to protect its product/market scope position within the group.
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EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC GROUPS
Response Likelihood and Lag
From strategic group theory a rationale can be deduced about the 
construct's influence on the capabilities of firms within groups and the difference 
in capabilities across groups. A rationale can also be deduced regarding the 
potential for a greater awareness of firms within groups to actions from group- 
member firms than from those firms outside the group; and also about the level 
of motivation to utilize and protect competitive advantage and product/market 
position. The strategic group literature base provides the theoretical foundation 
to deduce that strategic groups frame the responder's awareness of an action, its 
assessment of its capabilities and its motivation to respond. Based on the 
strategic group’s framing of awareness, capability, and motivation, and the 
influence of these three constructs on a responder’s response characteristics, it 
is hypothesized that the presence of strategic groups in an industry will influence 
competitive interaction and response characteristics. Thus,
H1: Firms will respond with a higher frequency-have a higher response
likelihood— to actions originating within a strategic group than to 
actions originating from outside a strategic group.
H2: Response lag will be greater to actions originating outside of the
responding firm’s strategic group; response lag will be lower for 
actions originating inside the responding firm's strategic group.
Also, the discussion on mobility barriers as presented above suggests the 
influence that strategic groups may have on awareness, capabilities and 
motivation is incremental, hence,
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H3: The response lag to an action will vary with the height of the
mobility barriers between groups.
Imitation
The strategic group literature also provides a basis to predict the degree to 
which firms’ responses will mimic, or imitate, an action. Mobility barriers protect 
firms from imitation from firms outside the group (Mascarenhas, 1989; Bogner, et 
al., 1994). The similarity of strategic capabilities within group provides the basis 
for an interpretation of the expected benefits to be gained from an action, and 
how similar capabilities can be utilized to appropriate those benefits. From the 
work of Feigenbaum and Thomas (1990) as well as from Porac, et al. (1994), the 
group can be interpreted as providing some institutional forces that influence the 
behaviors of decision makers and the resultant actions taken by the firm. 
Institutional theory (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983), then, would be expected to have 
an influence over the competitive interaction within and between groups. 
Therefore, imitative responses should be greater within group and lessen as the 
strategic distance from the acting firm increases. That is, if a firm in a different 
strategic group is responded to, strategic group and institutional theory would 
predict that the response does not match (i.e., imitate) the original action. This 
line of reasoning yield the following hypothesis:
H4: Response imitation will occur with greater frequency to actions
within a group than to actions which originate outside of a group.
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Response Order
Chen and Hambrick (1995) identified a response hierarchy based on firm 
size. Larger firms responded sooner to actions than did smaller firms. The 
question from a strategic group perspective is whether a response hierarchy 
exists within group. Is a specific response order identifiable to within-group 
actions? From the I/O literature on strategic groups, the group is seen as a 
means to coordinate the activities within the group (Harrigan, 1985; Petraf, 
1993), although this has not been empirically investigated. If there were a 
"pecking order” within groups, then we would expect to see a consistent 
response hierarchy. From multiple action events within a group, it should be 
possible to determine if the response order within group is consistent from action 
to action. Therefore,
H5: Firms within a strategic group will exhibit a consistent response
hierarchy, based on response order, to within-group actions.
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SUMMARY
The proposition was developed in this chapter that homophily and the 
strategic group are analogous constructs from two different research streams 
and that the strategic group should serve as a proxy for the homophily construct 
in the application of the CIP model. This chapter went on to present hypotheses 
developed from the intersection of strategic group theory and the CIP model of 
competitive interaction.
Firms in a strategic group are, in the terms of communication theory, 
homophilous—similar in characteristics. The existence of strategic groupings 
within an industry and the membership of a firm to a specific strategic grouping 
should have an influence on the competitive conduct of the firm within the 
industry and the strategic group. The influence of the strategic group on 
competitive conduct shculd, in turn, manifest itself in terms of the competitive 
response characteristics of the communication-information processing model of 
competitive interaction.
The proposition from the CIP model on the expected role of homophily in 
competitive interaction, the argument for strategic groupings resulting from a 
cognitive taxonomy of the competitive environment as well as similarity in 
resource investments, and the finding that strategic groups are stable over a 
period of time suggests that this study’s premise is supported by theoretical 
grounding in the literature of the two research streams discussed in this chapter.
The constructs within the strategic group literature have been presented 
and an argument about how these may contribute to the awareness, capabilities
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and motivation determinants of competitive response has been proposed. These 
determinants of competitive response are then used to predict the response 
characteristics to actions arising within a strategic group and how these 
dynamics compare to actions arising from other strategic groups. Table 1 
presents a summary of the hypotheses and the dependent and independent 
variables contained in these hypotheses.
Through the application of the strategic group construct to the CIP model 
of competitive interaction, the current study should shed light on the influence 
that strategic groups may have on competitive response characteristics among 
firms in a focal industry.
Chapter 4 presents the discussion of the methodology for this study, the 
measures for the dependent and independent variables, and the focal industry 
within which strategic groups were identified.
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Table 1
List of Hypotheses and Variables
Statement__________  Pep. Variable Indep. Variable
Hypothesis 1 RLK to outside-group 
actions < RLK to within 
group actions
Where RLK = Response 
likelihood of firms 
responding to an action, 
measured as frequency of 
responses to in-group v. 
out-group actions
Frequency of 
Response to 
an in-group v. 
out-group 
action
Similarity of 
Actor and 
Responder 
characteristic as 
measured by 
group
membership
Hypothesis 2 RL to outside-group 
actions >
RL to within group 
actions
RL =
Response Lag 
to an action 
(RL=time in 
days from 
initial action to 
response)
Similarity of
Actor & 
Responder 
characteristic as 
captured by 
strategic group 
membership
Hypothesis 3 RL = f(mobiiity barrier 
height)
Response Lag is a function 
of the height of the mobility 
barriers between the actors 
strategic group and the 
responder’s strategic 
groups. The greater this 
distance, the greater the 
response lag
RL =
Response Lag
(Time in days 
from initial 
action to 
response)
Mobility barrier 
height between 
the acting firm’s 
group and the 
responding 
firms' groups
(Euclidean
distance
between
groups)
Hypothesis 4 RM(Aig) > RM (Aog)
Among responding firms, 
Response imitation will be 
greater to in-group actions 
than to out-group actions .
RM =
Response
Imitation
(Match 
between 
action and 
response)
Strategic group 
membership of 
Actor, 
Responder
Hypothesis 5 A consistent response 
order is observable within 
groups.
Rank order of 
respondents 
based on RL
Competitive 
events in-group 
(Action, 
Responses)
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents the methodology to be used in this study and is 
organized into the following sections: (1) sample selection; (2) overall research 
procedure; (3) identification and measurement of dependent and independent 
variables; and (4) discussion of the statistical analyses used to test the 
hypotheses.
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SAMPLE SELECTION
The focal industry for this study is the U.S. steel industry. Data on 
competitive actions and responses were collected for firms represented in this 
industry. The U.S. steel industry was chosen because it was expected to yield a 
high incidence of competitive events. It is an industry that has been 
characterized as being in “decline” (Hogan, 1980) and with high exit barriers, 
making it conducive to high levels of competition (Harrigan, 1980). Selection of 
this industry expands the domain of previous work on competitive interaction 
along several dimensions. First, this study attempts to apply the findings derived 
from a service-based, consumer-related industry (the U.S. airline industry) to a 
manufacturing, producer-goods industry. Second, competitive members of the 
steel industry include international firms operating within the U.S. market. There 
have been recent calls for internationalization within strategic group studies 
(Hagedoom, 1995). The issue of internationalization has been addressed by 
selecting an industry that is global in nature (Roth, 1987). The steel industry is 
subject to global competition as determined by: (1) the amount of intra-industry 
trade at world and domestic (U.S.) market levels; and (2) the large number of 
non-U.S. firms ranked among the top ten producers in the global industry.
Steel producing firms operating in the U.S. from Asia (Japan, Korea), 
North America (Canada, U.S.) and the European Union (member countries as of 
1990) were included in the study. These geographic regions have been selected 
because: (1) they are historically important in the world steel market-most of the 
world’s largest producers are in these areas; and (2) they coincide with the
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location of major industrial countries--steel consumption is linked to industrial 
consumption.
The firms chosen were U.S. and foreign firms operating in the U.S. steel 
market identified from the Worldscope/Compact Disclosure database. Firms 
were selected on the basis of SIC code: 3310 (Iron and Steel Manufacturing).
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RESEARCH PROCEDURE
With the focal industry for the study identified, the research procedure 
requires: (1) identification of strategic groupings within the industry, and (2)
identification of competitive actions and responses occurring within the industry. 
Identification of Strategic Groups
Data for forming strategic groups was taken from Compact 
Disclosure/WoridScope, Compustat, and the Directory o f Iron and Steel Plants. 
The former two databases were chosen because of the selection and availability 
of data on publicly traded companies; the latter source was selected because it 
presents annual data on integrated, mini-mill and foreign steel producers on a 
number of industry-related variables. Data on industry-related variables is 
necessary to identify the strategic groups.
Several different grouping procedures have been applied in the research 
focusing on strategic groups. Porter (1980), for instance, focused on size as a 
grouping variable. Harrigan (1985) applied a clustering algorithm to strategically 
significant industry variables, as did Feignebaum and Thomas (1990). These 
methods of group identification can be classified as objective methods, as they 
use archival, firm-level data to derive groups. Others, such as Huff and Reger 
(1993) and Porac and Thomas (1994), have taken a subjective, more cognitively 
derived, approach towards the identification of groups. This method requires 
significant input from individuals within the firm. These individuals are usually 
from the upper echelon and are interviewed or surveyed. This information is then
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used to identify the cognitive schema that decision makers apply to their 
competitive environments. Those firms that have similar views of the competitive 
environment are classified in the same strategic group.
The choice of grouping method in strategic group research is influenced 
by the type of research being done (Thomas & Venkatramen, 1989). Large- 
scale, empirical studies apply objective methods to derive groups. This is 
generally because these studies involve a large number of firms, or a long 
period. For these types of studies, the subjective method may be perceived as 
being too onerous (Reger & Huff, 1993), or there may be a potential for decision 
makers to revise historical perceptions. Subjective methods of group 
identification are more generally used in studies that focus specifically on group 
identification, a small number of firms, or when the required research data is 
perceptual-based on firms' key informants-and in the same time frame as when 
the groups are derived (Daems & Thomas, 1994).
The nature of the present study fits the type to which objective methods of 
strategic group identification are applied. Cluster analysis is the most widely 
applied objective grouping method (Harrigan, 1985; Feigenbaum & Thomas, 
1990; Bogner & Thomas, 1993), and was chosen for this study. Cluster analysis 
is a multivariate statistical procedure that starts with a data set of information 
about a sample of entities and reorganizes the entities into relatively 
homogeneous groups (Aldenserfer & Blashfield, 1984).
The cluster method for forming strategic groups is not without criticism. 
Barney and Hoskisson (1990) question the validity of the procedure to derive
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consistent groupings. Hatten and Hatten (1987) indicate that the appearance of 
strategic groups may be an artifact of methodology. These issues appear to be 
rebutted, however, by the findings of temporal consistency in the structure of 
strategic groups in an industry over time (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1990)
Cluster analysis for group classification requires the specification of the 
grouping variables and the analysis of the data to identify the group structure. 
The selected variables tap firm attributes that reflect the product/market scope 
and strategic resource dimensions, which are central concepts of the strategic 
group literature base. The selected attribute variables for this study also reflect 
product/market scope and resource dimensions. An extensive review of the 
strategic group literature and steel products and manufacturing literature 
provided a basis for the firm-level variables selected to use for the identification 
of strategic groups. These variables are given in Table 2.
Table 2
Resource and Product Variables Used in Group Clustering Algorithm
Resource/Capability Variables Product
Variables
Basic Oxygen Furnace Sheet
-number Strip
-capacity Blooms
Electric Arc Furnace Billets
-number Slabs
-capacity Plate
Average Heat Size Bars
Blast Furnace Shapes
-number Rails
-capacity Oil Country Goods
Mill Types Pipe & Tubing
Blackplate
Tinplate
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The resource/capability variables identified above represent how the 
company manufactures steel. Ghemawat (1990) characterizes these types of 
resources as strategic assets. Cool and Diereckx (1994) apply the term resource 
stocks—what the firm has to work with--to these types of firm-level attributes. 
These strategic assets, or resource stocks, are utilized by the firm to 
manufacture their product lines. The capabilities of a firm, and its competitive 
advantage arise, in part, from these strategic assets (Barney, 1991). The 
product variables identified above represent the different products that a 
company produces for the market.
Cluster analysis was used to assess the similarity between firms in the 
focal industry on key firm attributes listed in Table 2 (Sharma, 1996). There are 
two general types of cluster analysis techniques: hierarchical and non- 
hierarchical. The former is used when the underlying group structure is not 
known; the latter is applied when the number of clusters is known a priori. 
Hergert (1987) analyzed 45 industries and found that the number of groups in an 
industry ranged from two to six, with a mode of four. However, the steel industry 
was not included in Hergert's study; therefore, we have no a priori basis for 
seeding the clusters as required for the non-hierarchical technique. The 
hierarchical technique of cluster analysis was, therefore, chosen for use in this 
study.
Within the hierarchical clustering technique, an algorithm must be applied 
to compute distances between two clusters (Sharma, 1996). Because the 
interest in this study is in maximizing in-group similarity, consistent with the
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homophily construct, a method that achieves this objective was chosen: Ward's 
linkage method. Ward’s method was used to identify groupings of firms along 
similar product and resource attributes identified in Table 2. A calculation of the 
Euclidean distance between groups is part of the data that results from the 
application of the clustering method. The closer the Euclidean distance between 
groups, the more closer the strategic groups are in terms of product/scope and 
resource/capability attributes. The greater the Euclidean distance, the further 
apart groups are on the selected attributes. Ward’s linkage method forms 
clusters by maximizing similarity within group and dissimilarity between groups. 
This clustering method yields groupings of firms homophilous (i.e., similar) on the 
set of characteristics analyzed, a condition discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 that 
was expected to have an influence on the competitive interaction among firms in 
an industry.
Identification of Competitive Actions and Responses.
To be consistent with previous research and increase the possibility for
cross-study comparison the definitions and operationalization of the action and
response variables follow those of Chen and colleagues (1988, 1990-1996).
Chen (1988:111) gives the definition of a competitive action as:
a specific market move, e.g., a price cut, a market expansion, a 
special promotion campaign, etc., initiated by a firm in an effort to 
create a potentially stronger market position vis-a-vis its 
competitor(s).
A response is defined as "a market move, taken by a competing firm in the 
industry to counteract an initial competitive action" (Chen, 1988:111).
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The methodology used to collect the data on actions and responses within 
the focal industry is structured content analysis. This method of content analysis 
was introduced and applied by Jauch, Osbom and Martin (1980) in a comparison 
of data included in case studies, and was applied by Chen (1988) in the study of 
competitive interaction in the U.S. airline industry. The data used in structured 
content analysis is from archival sources, such as case studies, journals, 
newspapers or trade publications. The application of this technique requires the 
development of a pre-designed, structured coding sheet to collect data on the 
variables of interest, in this case the actors, action-type, responders, response- 
lag.
Data were collected in this manner for actions and responses, consistent 
with the definitions stated above. Previous application of this technique was 
done with a single rater to collect the indicated data on actions and responses. 
Because both action-type and response imitation are binary variables (price/non­
price; match/non-match) which must be identifiable from the entry in the archival 
source, the judgement was made that a single rater was justifiable for the 
purposes of this study.
Data on actions and responses in the steel industry cover the period from 
1991 to 1993 and were obtained from the American Metal Market (AMM). This 
period was chosen because it represents a stable period in demand. In 1994 
through 1997, demand for steel in the U.S. market increased. In order to control 
for the potential effects of changing demand levels on competitive interaction, a 
stable period was chosen, as periods of decline or increased demand may alter
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competitive behaviors in an industry (Harrigan, 1980). The AMM is a daily 
publication that covers the metal industry, including steel, in the United States. 
AMM provides news and coverage of items of interest to the decision makers of 
firms in this industry and is widely read by them, thus meeting the nominal criteria 
established by Chen (1988) for the selection of archival data source for use in the 
conduct of this type of inquiry.
Reported incidences that meet the definition of “action” or “response” were 
coded for the following items: firm name; response/action type; if response, the 
action type responded to; strategic group of the actor and responder; the date of 
the response; and the date of the initial action; and whether or not the response 
was a match to the action. These definitions and operationalizations are given in 
Table 3.
Statistical Analyses
The statistical tests applied to the tests of hypotheses include chi-square, 
and linear regression. Each hypothesis discussed in Chapter 3 is presented 
below with a discussion of the associated test and an initial interpretation of the 
hypothesis if the test indicates that the hypothesis is rejected, or the statistical 
evidence fails to reject the hypothesis.
The first hypothesis essentially states that there is an expected 
association between the group membership of the actor, the group membership 
of the responder, and the frequency of response to actions. A higher frequency 
of response is expected to be made to actions initiated by group members than 
to actions arising from outside a responder’s group. The independent variable is
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Table 3
Definition and Operationalization of Study Variables
I
Definition of Variable Operationalization of Variable
Action A move announced by a company in the steel 
industry, as reported in American Metal Market.
Response A countermove announced by a steel company, to a 
specific action or actor, as reported in AMM.
Action type Coded to capture the nature of the action.
P=price actions, such as increases or decreases.
NP= non-price actions, such as market expansion or 
contraction or placement of the action within the acting 
firm’s value chain.
Response type Coded to capture the nature of the response.
P=price responses, such as increases or decreases. 
NP=non-price responses, such as market expansion 
or contraction.
Response imitation 
(Dependent Variable)
Match between action type and response type. 
Discerned from the information contained on both 
action and response in the AMM (match=1, 
nomatch=0).
Response lag 
(Dependent Variable)
The time in days between the action and the 
response.
Response likelihood 
(Dependent Variable)
Frequency count of the responses made by a firm to 
in-group actions (Ri) and frequency count of the 
responses made by a firm to out-group actions (Ro).
Group membership 
(Independent Variable)
Indicates if responder and actor are from the same 
strategic group (same=1; notsame=0). For a 
response, the group membership of the responding 
firm is checked against the group membership of the 
acting firm.
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the similarity of group membership between the actor and responder. This is a 
nominal variable. The dependent variable is the frequency count of responses 
when actor/responder are from the same group, and when actor/responder are 
from different groups. Because we are observing frequencies of response and 
these frequencies are expected to be associated with similarity of group 
membership between actor and responder, a chi-square test of association is 
applicable to test this hypothesis. This hypothesis was tested using a chi-square 
test on the observed frequency of in-group and out-group responses to actions. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the observed responses 
(frequency of responses) and the expected responses between “in-group” and 
“out-group” categories. If the chi-square test is significant there is an association 
between frequency of response and similarity of group membership between 
actor/responder. The association indicates that there is a difference in response 
likelihood and hypothesis 1 would be supported.
Hypothesis 2 states an expectation that response lag will be greater to 
actions originating outside the responder's group than from within the 
responder's group. The difference of means test (t-test) is applicable here. The 
observations of actions and responses represent the "population" of actions and 
responses during the period. Response Lag, the dependent variable, is an 
interval variable, as it is measured in number of days from action to response. 
As with Hypothesis 1 the independent variable is the similarity of group 
membership between the actor and responder. This is a nominal, or categorical, 
variable. The null hypothesis here is that there is no difference in mean
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response lag to actions originating in-group or out-group. A significant test 
statistic would lead one to conclude that there is a difference in mean response 
lag to actions originating in-group v. out-group.
The third hypothesis regarding the expected relationship between 
response lag and mobility barriers was tested using simple linear regression 
given by the equation RL = xMOBAR + e; where x is the beta value and e is the 
error term. Response lag (RL), the dependent variable, is a discrete, interval 
variable, measuring the time in days between the action and the response. The 
height of the mobility barrier (MOBAR) is the independent variable. It is 
measured by the group centroid distance, which is given by the Euclidean 
distance between clusters of firms obtained from the clustering algorithm 
(Harrigan, 1985). MOBAR is a continuous variable that ranges from null to the 
numeric quantity of the greatest Euclidean distance between groups.
The fourth hypothesis stated that response imitation is expected to occur 
with greater frequency to actions originating within a strategic group than to 
actions from outside the group. Similarity of group membership between the 
actor and responder is the independent variable and response imitation is the 
dependent variable. Both are categorical, or nominal, variables. Similarity of 
group membership between the actor and responder is expected to influence the 
frequency of response imitation (match, no-match). Here, as with Hypothesis 1, 
a chi-square test on the observed vs. expected frequency of response imitation 
over the two conditions (in-group response imitation, out-group response 
imitation) is a valid test.
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The last hypothesis states that a response hierarchy, based on response 
order to an initiating action, is expected to exist with groupings of firms. This 
hypothesis required identifying response order patterns to within-group actions. 
Groups with multiple actions occurring within them were identified, and the 
ranking of response order for each within-group competitive action was identified. 
The within group ranking pattern was compared for each action event within 
group. The Friedman test for comparison of rank order data was applied. This 
non-parametric test identifies the ranking of frequencies in blocks as influenced 
by treatments. In this case, the blocks are the ith responding firm in Group n, the 
treatment is the competitive event, and the ranking is the /th firm's ranking in 
response lag (response order).
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SUMMARY
This chapter presented the U.S. steel industry as the focal industry to 
which the CIP model of competitive interaction was applied to determine if the 
strategic group construct bears an influence on the response characteristics of 
the model. The methodology for data collection (structured content analysis), the 
sources of data, and the method for identifying strategic groups (cluster analysis) 
were described. The next chapter presents the results of the data analysis and 
the tests of hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS
This chapter presents the empirical results of the strategic groupings of 
firms in the U.S. steel industry and the tests of the hypotheses identified in 
Chapter 3, according to the methodology discussed in Chapter 4. The chapter is 
organized into the following sections: (1) the identification of the firms within 
strategic groups and the presentation of the Euclidean distance between groups; 
(2) the categorization of the competitive actions identified; (3) and the empirical 
tests of Hypotheses 1 through 5.
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IDENTIFICATION OF STRATEGIC GROUPS 
Identification of Firms and Groups
U.S. and foreign firms operating in the steel industry were identified from 
the Worldscope/Compact Disclosure database. Firms were selected based on 
SIC code. Firms with an SIC code of 3310 (Iron and Steel Manufacturing) were 
initially identified, yielding 108 firms. Firms that were not in Asia, North America, 
or Europe were eliminated from further inclusion in the study. Therefore, firms 
such as Iscor (South Africa) and Grupo Sidek (Mexico) were not included in the 
study, nor were any Latin American firms, resulting in 49 firms eliminated from 
further study. The exclusion of firms from these regions was suggested by 
Jacobson: “Industrialized countries and the Western World have greater
apparent steel consumption than developing countries, the former USSR/Eastern 
Europe, China, and other Centrally planned economies" (p.26, 1993). Data on 
the steel industry indicate that both production and consumption of steel products 
was higher in the U.S., Europe, and Asia, as compared to Latin America, Mexico, 
Africa, and other developing nations.
The next screen to determine which firms to include in forming strategic 
groups was the availability of data on key product/market attributes and 
production capacity. Data on these attributes (see Table 2) were collected from 
the Directory of Iron and Steel Plants (1992, 1993, and 1994). Data for 21 U.S. 
firms were available on each of the attributes. Four U.S. firms were excluded at 
this juncture. These four firms were either not listed in the Directory, or their data 
were too incomplete for inclusion in the subsequent cluster analysis. Sixteen
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foreign firms were listed in the Directory. The 37 firms remaining from the 
screens and utilized in the cluster analysis to form firm groupings are given in 
Table 4.
Table 4 
Sample Firms
Company Country Company Country
Acme US Laclede US
Bethlehem Steel US British Steel UK
Algoma Steel Canada Broken Hill Australia
Dofasco Steel Canada China Steel Taiwan
Geneva Steel US Cockerill-Sambre Belgium
Inland Steel US Hoesch German
LTV US Kawasaki Japan
Oregon steel US Kobe Japan
Stelco Canada Republic US
USS US Roanoke US
Wheeling US Laclede US
Bayou US Nippon Japan
Birmingham US NKK Japan
Chaparral US POSCO Korea
Florida US Sumitomo Japan
New Jersey US Thyssen German
Nucor US Usinor-Sacilor France
NorthStar
Steel
US Northwestern Steel 
& Wire
US
Weirton US
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Utilizing Ward’s linkage method cluster analysis, groupings of firms along 
similar product and capability attributes were obtained. Ward’s linkage method 
forms clusters by maximizing within-cluster homogeneity, resulting in groupings 
of observations that are similar along a combination of attributes of the product 
and resource dimensions. This method addresses the product and resource 
similarity concepts central to the strategic group literature. From this procedure, 
six clusters were identified. These are indicated in Table 5.
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Table 5
Strategic Groups Resulting from Cluster Analysis
Cluster t Firms Product/Market
Cluster 1 4 firms: Acme 
Geneva 
Oregon 
Laclede
Tubing and Pipe 
Shapes 
Steel Piling 
Plate
Cluster 2 6 firms: Bethlehem 
Algoma 
LTV 
USS 
NKK 
Weirton
Rails Structurals 
Piling Line Pipe 
Tubing Electric Sheet 
Blackplate Tinplate 
Sheet Plate
Cluster 3 4 firms: Dofasco 
Stelco 
Wheeling 
Cockerill-Sambre
Tinplate Galvanized Sheet
Shapes Piling
Plate
Cluster 4 6 firms: Inland
British Steel 
China Steel 
Kobe 
POSCO
Plate
Sheet
Bars
Cluster 5 8 firms Bayou
Birmingham 
Florida Steel 
New Jersey 
Nucor 
Republic 
Roanoke 
Chaparral 
NorthStar 
North Western 
Steel & Wire
Bars
Rebar
Shapes
Sheet
Plate
Piling
Wirerod
Light Structurals
Cluster 6 6 firms: Usinor-Sacilor 
Thyssen 
Nippon 
Kawasaki 
Hoesch 
Broken Hill 
Sumitomo
Wirerod
Rebar
Bar
Structurals
Shapes
Pipe
Strip
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Euclidean distance between groups
Table 6 indicates the distances betwee n cluster centroids. This table 
indicates that clusters 4 and 3 are the closest (i.e., most similar), with a centroid 
distance of 3.8763 and that clusters 2 and 5 are the farthest (i.e., most 
dissimilar), with a cluster centroid distance of 6.8782. Note that clusters 4 and 6 
are also proximal, with a centroid distance of 3.9088. Also note that clusters 3, 4 
and 6 are predominantly comprised of firms from Europe, Asia, and Canada, 
while clusters 1, 2, and 5 represent primarily U.S. firms.
Table 6
Euclidean Distances Between Groups
Cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 _ 4.7892 4.2700 4.2256 4.3074 4.9514
2 4.7892 _ 5.1999 5.0406 6.8782 4.6993
3 4.2700 5.1999 - 3.8763 4.6218 4.7907
4 4.2256 5.0406 3.8763 _ 4.8862 3.9088
5 4.3074 6.8782 4.6218 4.8862 - 4.7751
6 4.9514 4.6993 4.7907 3.9088 4.7751 -
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CATEGORIZATION OF COMPETITIVE ACTIONS 
AND RESPONSES
Over the three-year research period, 487 actions and 262 responses were 
identified. Three-quarters of the actions were categorized as "non-price actions"; 
25% were identified as "price actions." Price increases over the three-year 
period were the dominant type of price move. Of the 262 responses, 79.8% were 
price responses, and 20.2% were non-price responses. Table 7 summarizes 
these data.
Table 7
Summary of Actions and Responses
Year PriceAction
Non-Price
Action TOTAL
1993 53 96 149
1992 21 144 165
1991 17 156 173
TOTAL 91 386 487
Year PriceResponse
Non-Price
Response TOTAL
1993 119 17 136
1992 64 27 27
1991 26 9 9
TOTAL 209 53 262
To be consistent with Chen (1988), the types of competitive moves were 
categorized. The most common type of action taken across groups was a pricing 
action, followed closely by an "upgrade" (i.e., investment in plant and
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equipment), and then by a cutback in operations or facility closure. Table 8 
summarizes the action categories.
Table 8
Categories of Actions Observed
Action Type Frequency
Upgrades (Plant & Equipment, Capital Investment) 14% 66
International Actions 11% 56
Cutbacks / Plant, Facility Closures 10% 50
Changes in Organization Structure 8% 38
Market Expansions/ New Facilities 8% 39
Process Innovations 7% 36
Divestments (Sale of Operating Units, Equipment) 5% 25
Joint Ventures Joint Agreements 4% 20
Product Innovations 4% 19
Regulatory Actions 2% 10
Mergers/Acquisitions 3% 12
Operations Restarts 2% 9
Market Retrenchments 1% 6
Pricing Actions 18% 91
TOTAL 487
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TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated an expected relationship between the likelihood of a 
response to an action and the origin of an action (in-group, out-group). A higher 
frequency of response is expected to actions initiated by firms in the responder's 
strategic group. The responses made over the 1991 to 1993 period were 
identified as being made to an in-group action or an out-group action. The 
resultant frequencies of the observations were then compared to those 
frequencies expected if there were no influence from group membership. Table 
9 summarizes the observed frequencies and expected frequencies of in-group 
and out-group responses. The resulting %2 = 5.10, which is greater than the 
expected level (3.84) at the .05 level of significance. Hypothesis 1, therefore, is 
supported: firms were more likely to respond to within group actions than to 
actions arising from outside the strategic group.
Table 9
Results of Hypothesis 1 TestrResponse Type by Actor's Group Membership
Response Type ExpectedFrequency
Observed
Frequency
Calculated
Chi-square
In-group 113 130 2.55
Out-group 113 96 2.55
Total 226 226 5.10 (df= 1)
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Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 stated that firms would take longer to respond to out-group 
actions than to in-group actions. For each response identified in the test for 
Hypothesis 1, the time lag in days was calculated between the response date 
and the action date. Therefore, if a firm made a response, as reported in 
American Metal Market, to another firm in its group on 12/6/93 and the action 
occurred on 12/1/93, the lag for this in-group response was recorded as five 
days. The mean response lag was calculated for in-group responses (10.2 days) 
and out-group responses (17.1 days). Table 10 gives the results of the test for 
the difference between in-group response means and out-group response 
means. Hypothesis 2 is supported at the .01 level of significance (p=.0000): 
there is a difference between mean response rates to in-group and out-groups 
actions, with firms responding, on average, seven days sooner to in-group 
actions as compared to out-group actions.
Table 10
Results of Hypothesis 2 Test: Response Lag by Actor and Responder
Group Membership
Response Lag n Mean Standard Deviation
In-group 134 10.2 10.1
Out-group 107 17.1 13.8
f-value 4.49 df=239 p=.0000
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 expected a relationship between response lag (RL) and the 
height of the mobility barriers (MOBAR) between groups. MOBAR is given by
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the Euclidean distance between groups (ref. Table 5.2). Only out-group 
responses were utilized for this test, because the relationship of interest is that of 
the mobility barriers between groups, and the lag in initiating a response. For 
each out-group response, the response lag and the Euclidean distance between 
the responding firm’s group and acting firm’s were identified. For example, if a 
firm in strategic group 1 made a response to an action by a firm in strategic group 
2, the response lag in days and the Euclidean distance between the two groups, 
in this case 4.7892, were recorded for the competitive event (i.e., the 
action/response pair). Table 11 summarizes the regression equation.
The data were analyzed with the Minitab statistical analysis software 
package. The results of the regression analysis of RL on MOBAR indicate that 
MOBAR is a significant predictor of response lag (p=.007) and that the 
regression equation derived from the analysis is also significant (F=7.54, 
p=.007). The equation indicates that MOBAR is negatively related to response 
lag. Because Hypothesis 3 was stated as non-directional (i.e., two-tailed), 
Hypothesis 3 is supported: response lag does vary with the height of the mobility 
barrier between actor and responder. Specifically, response lag varies 
negatively with the height of the mobility barriers. The closer the strategic group 
of the outside actor to the responder's strategic group the longer a period of time 
passes before a response is made. In comparison, responses that are more 
rapid are made to actions arising in groups that are separated by a greater 
distance (i.e., higher mobility barrier). The significance of this finding is 
discussed in Chapter 6.
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Table 11
Results cf Hypothesis 3 Test: Regression of Response Lag on MOBAR
Equation RL = 35.11 -  3.36 MOBAR F =  7.54, p=0.007, R-sq. = 6.9%
Predictor Coefficient St.Deviation f-ratio p-value
Constant 35.11 6.853 5.11 0.000
MOBAR -3.358 1.223 -2.75 0.007
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 investigated whether responses matching (i.e., imitating) an 
action were related to group membership of the actor and responder. Each in­
group response was identified as either matching or non-matching the acting 
firm's move. The same was done for out-group responses. Table 12 presents 
the contingency table resulting from the frequency counts of matching and non­
matching responses to in-group and out-group actors. The data indicate that 
there is a significant relationship between in-group/out-group response and 
whether the response is a match or non-match to an action. Firms responding to 
in-group actors are more likely to match the action; when responding to non­
group actors, the action is not likely to be matched (%2 = 22.9, d f=  1, a  = .05).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
Table 12
Results of Hypothesis 4 Test: Response Type by Actor's Group
Membership
Source of 
Action
Matching
Responses
Observed (Expected)
Non-matching
Responses
Observed (Expected)
Total
In-group 115 (99.21) 66 (81.79) 181
Out-group 16 (31.79) 42 (26.21) 58
Total 131 108 239
Chi-square = 22.919 df= 1
Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 stated that firms responding to an action were expected to 
form a hierarchy, or pecking-order, to actions arising within groups. Actions in 
strategic groups and the responses they generated were identified from the 
action-response data collected for this study. However, not every firm in a group 
responded to every action. Because this situation resulted in missing data in the 
actor-responder matrix, this hypothesis was not testable using the non- 
parametric Friedman test for the comparison of rank-ordered data. This test is a 
non-parametric equivalent to ANOVA, but, because the cell values are based on 
the ranking of firms on the occurrence of interest (in this case response lag to an 
in-group action) the test cannot handle missing data. While this hypothesis was 
not statistically testable due to the distribution of the data, visual inspection was 
utilized to deduce the possible response hierarchies within groups.
The two most active groups were identified: strategic group 2 (SG2) and 
strategic group 5 (SG5). Within group 5, whenever Nucor made a move,
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Chaparral was most frequently the first respondent, responding to 54% of 
Nucor's moves that generated an in-group response. Chaparral was closely 
followed by Northwestern Steel and Wire, which was first respondent to 46% of 
Nucor's moves that generated an in-group response. With moves initiated by 
Chaparral and responded to in-group, Northwestern Steel and Wire was 
predominately the first respondent (91%) among responding firms. Northwestern 
was also a primary respondent to moves initiated by Bayou Steel. In cases 
where Bethlehem Steel initiated actions that were responded to in group 2, USS 
was the most common first respondent (66%), followed by LTV (33%). When 
actions were initiated by USS, Bethlehem was most often the first respondent 
(66%), followed by LTV (33%). Based on these observations, there does appear 
to exist a "pecking order" to actions made within groups. While these 
observations do not empirically validate Hypothesis 5, they do suggest that a 
consistent response order, or "pecking order" exists to actions made within 
groups.
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SUMMARY
This chapter presented the results of the cluster analysis of firms in the 
U.S. steel industry, and the strategic groups formed by analysis of the product 
and resource variables identified in Chapter 4. Six groups were identified. 
These groupings were then used to test the relationships regarding response 
characteristics presented in Hypotheses 1 through 5, to determine if strategic 
groups have an influence on the competitive interaction in an industry as 
captured by the Communication-lnformation Model of Competitive Interaction 
presented as discussed in Chapter 2.
The findings indicate that response likelihood is related to the source of 
the action, i.e., firms were more likely to respond to in-group actions. Firms also 
responded more quickly to in-group actions. As the distance between strategic 
groups increased, response lag decreased. Firms that responded to an action 
were more likely to imitate the actions of in-group firms. The empirical support for 
the hypotheses implies that strategic groups do influence competitive interaction. 
The primary thesis of this study is, therefore, supported.
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was two-fold. The first objective was to extend the 
generalizability of the CIP model to a different industry domain from which it had 
been applied and from which theory regarding the model had been developed. 
Support for four of the five hypotheses indicates that the model and the theory 
upon which it is built do generalize through large-scale empirical investigation to 
an industry beyond the U.S. airline industry. The second objective of the study 
was to determine if the strategic group construct had an influence on competitive 
interaction in a focal industry. In this study the strategic group construct of the 
Strategic Management and I/O economics research streams was identified as a 
potential proxy for the homophily construct of communication-information theory. 
As a proxy, the strategic groups construct would be expected to exhibit similar 
associations as homophily with key variables of the CIP model. Competitive 
interaction in the U.S. steel industry was observed through the application of the 
Communication-lnformation Processing Model of Competitive Interaction. In this 
study, Hypotheses 1 through 4 were supported at significant levels. The support 
of these hypotheses, which were developed by applying the theoretical reasoning 
of the strategic group literature to the constructs of the CIP model, strongly 
suggests that the strategic group construct may well indeed have an influence on 
competitive interaction in the industry observed.
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COMPETITIVE RESPONSES: LIKELIHOOD, LAG, 
MATCHING AND HIERARCHY
The strategic group literature presented in Chapter 3 delineated how the 
strategic group construct, as a proxy for the homophily construct of 
communication-information processing theory, was expected to influence the 
action-response dynamics of competitive interaction through the latter construct's 
proposed influence on awareness, capabilities and motivation. The empirical 
support for Hypotheses 1 through 4 clearly identifies a relationship between 
strategic groups and competitive interaction, as captured by the CIP model. 
Hypothesis 1
The support for Hypothesis 1 suggests that firms are more likely to 
respond to actions made by group members than by non-group members. It can 
be deduced from theory that greater awareness of group member firms 
(Harrigan, 1985; Caves & Porter, 1979) may contribute to this greater likelihood 
of in-group response. However, these researchers proposed that greater 
awareness of mutual dependence would lessen the level of rivalry (competitive 
interaction) in-group. The support for this hypothesis suggests support for the 
proposition of Cool and Diereckx (1987) and Hergert (1987) that firms in groups 
are more strongly competitive (i.e., stronger rivals). It can also be deduced that 
the within-group resource similarities may provide the basis of capability 
necessary to organize a response to an in-group action. The grouping 
methodology maximizes homogeneity within and heterogeneity between groups, 
resulting in groups that are dissimilar in product scope and resource profiles.
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Since resources beget capabilities, the findings suggest that it may be easier for 
firms to muster the capabilities to respond to in-group actions and that it is more 
difficult (i.e., less likely) for firms to respond to out-group actions. Motivation may 
also play a role in this finding. Capabilities provide a foundation for competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991). Since competitive advantages may be competed 
away if they are not unique and inimitable, not only may it be easier for within- 
group firms to respond to one another due to resource similarities, but the 
potential loss of an incremental competitive advantage may motivate firms to 
respond more quickly to within-group actions.
We must recall that the level of threat, within the CIP framework, is 
assessed 'real-time' as the action and the possibilities of response are being 
cognitively processed by the potential respondents' upper echelons. Therefore, 
due to the perceived impact on competitive advantage, a move by a strategic 
group member, operating in similar product/market space, may be perceived at 
the time the information is assessed as a greater threat, resulting in a greater 
likelihood of response as compared to a move by a firm in another group, 
operating in dissimilar product/market space.
It must be recalled that the strategic group construct was used as a proxy 
for homophily, and that homophily is proposed to influence competitive 
interaction through awareness, capability and motivation. The archival nature of 
the research design did not allow for the relationship between strategic group 
membership and awareness, capability and motivation to be specifically teased 
out at this stage. The redress for this issue is discussed in the section presenting
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the limitations to the current study.
Hypothesis 2
The data support the hypothesis that it takes longer (i.e., higher response 
lag) for firms to respond to out-group actions compared to in-group actions. 
Whether the responses were made to in-group or out-group actions, there must 
have been some motivation to respond to the actions, since, according to Chen 
and MacMillan (1992), motivation is a necessary condition for response. The lag, 
therefore, could be explained as a difference in the responders’ awareness of the 
actions or the responders’ capability. These findings provide support for 
Harrigan's (1985) claim that firms in the same group are more aware of each 
other, suggesting that it takes longer for firms to become aware of the action, or 
the degree of threat an action presents, by an out-group firm.
Harrigan's premise is that in-group firms can interpret communications 
from other group members more readily that those from outside the group. 
These findings appear to substantiate that premise. Response lag should be 
short if a firm is aware of an action, is motivated to respond, and has the 
capabilities to respond. The greater response lag between groups indicates that 
firms may not be aware of an out-group action, or, if aware, it takes time to 
process the impact that the move has on the firm. This impact provides the 
motivation to respond. Given the motivation, the dissimilarity of resource profiles 
may limit the capabilities of a firm to respond. This limitation in capabilities 
contributes to response lag, as firms attempt to reconfigure or acquire assets or 
reassess their position to respond; reconfiguring, aquiring and reassessing take
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time (Mascarenhas & Aker, 1992; Cool & Diereckx, 1993).
The finding for Hypothesis 2 also supports the concept that past resource 
investments limit the decision alternatives available to top management 
(Ghemawat, 1990; Tang & Thomas, 1994). From a decision making perspective, 
responses to similar competitors utilizing similar strategies and similar resources 
to compete in similar markets may be more of the programmed versus non­
programmed variety. Programmed decisions are more easily and quickly made 
and implemented than non-programmed decisions. On the other hand, 
responding to out-group actions may require more non-programmed decisions to 
accommodate "new" information passing through the sense-making process. 
Non-programmed decisions take longer to make and implement.
This characterization of the decision types applied to competitive 
situations can be inferred from the cognitive simplification and cognitive framing 
that strategic groups are said to provide to the decision-making process. Since 
Feigenbaum and Thomas (1990) refer to strategic group members as referents 
to firms within group, the actions from these firms may pass through the sense- 
making process as structured problems.
Hypothesis 3
The data support the hypothesis that response lag varies with the height 
of the mobility barriers between groups. This hypothesis was stated without 
directionality due to the equivocality of previous findings in strategic group 
research and due to the conflicting arguments that have been conceptualized. 
The finding that response lag is negatively related to the height of mobility
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barriers is perhaps the most important finding in this study. This finding indicates 
support for the line of reasoning in the strategic group literature that groups with 
a greater strategic distance, as measured by Euclidean distance (i.e., higher 
mobility barriers), are more intense rivals than groups that are closer. The 
empirical support for this proposition in the literature has been limited. This 
finding, therefore, lends support to the proposition that the greater the strategic 
distance between groups the greater the rivalry between groups. Because of the 
equivocal findings regarding this proposition, the hypothesis relating response 
lag and Euclidean distance merits testing in other industry contexts in order to 
determine if this finding holds in other industry domains. Since the responses to 
in-group actions were eliminated from the data pool for the test of this 
hypothesis, and the mobility barrier between firms in the same group is zero, the 
finding of support for Hypothesis 3 implies that an inverted U-shape relationship 
exists between response lag and distance. This is deduced from combining the 
finding of Hypothesis 2 with the finding from Hypothesis 3.
The implication of this finding for the Communication Information 
Processing Model of Competitive Interaction is that there may be a response 
hierarchy to actions among groups. First, given an action, firms are more likely 
to respond and respond in a more timely manner to in-group firms. Second, 
firms are not as likely to respond to out-group actions, but when they do, there 
may be a greater awareness of and motivation to respond to out-group firms at a 
further distance, even though capabilities are dissimilar. Third, firms in out­
groups that are "close" may only require careful watching to interpret the impact
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of their actions, rather than mounting an all-out quick response.
But, why do firms from distant groups appear to elicit a quicker response 
than firms in closer groups? The theory behind the CIP model would argue that 
motivation may be the driver in the difference in response lag to near out-group 
and distant out-group firms. According to Chen and Miller (1994), response lag 
is lower when motivation to respond is high. When the responding firms assess 
the action as a significant, credible threat, they are motivated to respond.
One explanation to the diffemtial response lag may lie in the threat that an 
action presents from the perspective of the responding firm's upper echelon. 
Firms from distant groups may pose a greater perceived threat (i.e., provide 
more motivation to respond) than firms from closer groups. The "message" 
interpreted from the action of the distant out-group may be understood as more 
threatening than the action of a near out-group. For example, firms from distant 
groups could be interpreted as "invading" a group's product/market space with 
different, or innovative, resource profiles, therefore requiring a swift response to 
parry the action. Porterian strategy would call for the responding firm to make a 
pre-emptive statement (i.e., response) to the incursion of the out-group firm. If a 
move is interpreted as a credible threat, response lag will be lower than if the 
action is not interpreted as a significant threat by the responding firm (Chen & 
MacMillan, 1992).
Figure 5 details the possible association among action source, threat 
assessment, and response lag in terms of a responder's awareness of an action 
by either a distant or near out-group firm. From the theory underpinning the CIP
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model, high response lag is associated with a low assessment of threat. The 
finding of support for Hypothesis 3 would appear to contradict the influence that 
strategic groups may have on awareness, as earlier stated. This contradiction, 
however, can be explained. Response lag is measured from the time of the 
action to the time of the response. It is beyond the scope and methodology of 
the present study to assess awareness lag; there is no means to directly assess 
the relationship between awareness and Euclidean distance. The awareness lag 
for actions of distant out-group firms may be greater than for near out-group 
firms. The present finding does suggest, however, that, once aware, responders 
react more quickly to distant out-group firms. Thus, if we decompose response 
lag into two components we would have the following statement:
R l — A l +  R E l
Where,
Rl = response lag
Al = awareness lag (the elapsed time from action to the time of the 
responder's awareness of the action)
REl = Reaction lag (the elapsed time from the responder's awareness of 
the action to the response made to the action)
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Figure 5
Strategic Group Distance, Threat Assessment and Response Lag
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Thus, the current finding regarding Hypothesis 3 suggests the following 
relationships between near-group and distant-group awareness lag, as depicted 
in Table 13. The identification of the possible decomposition of response lag into 
awareness lag and reaction lag has not been advanced in prior research of the 
application of the CIP model, nor has the potential contingent relationship 
between the distance of the group source of an action and the levels of 
awareness and reaction lags.
Table 13
Contingent Relationship Between Group Proximity, Awareness Lag and
Reaction Lag
Near-group Distant-group
Awareness
Lag
LOW HIGH
Reaction Lag HIGH LOW
The current findings reflect a very constrained time period in the history of 
the focal industry. To suggest that the relationship between response lag and 
group distance is static would be flawed without further investigation across 
different time periods and in different industries. Even though the stability of 
groups has been identified as being long-term, the dynamics of group relations 
have barely been probed. The relationships among groups, over time, may be 
more dynamic than the static nature indicated in the current literature. If further 
investigations consistent with the one presented here identify a dynamic setting, 
this could be one explanation for the equivocality of previous findings regarding
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the levels of rivalry and group distance.
The research done to date on the CIP model does not include a study on 
the relationship between response lag and the quality (i.e., outcomes) of 
response. The study of decision speed and outcomes, however, is a growing 
area in strategic management research (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Eisenhardt, 1989, 1992). Are quick responses to distant out-group actions 
consistent with the responding firm's intended strategy, or do they represent a 
step on the pathway to an emergent strategy? Do firms that take longer to react 
to distant out-group actions fare better in the long-run than firms that are quick to 
react/respond? These questions are open to further study in the exploration and 
application of the CIP model. Application of the CIP model in such a manner 
would contribute to the development of the relationships between top- 
management consensus, decision speed and performance.
Hypothesis 4
The sample firms were roughly seven times more likely to match an action 
when responding to an in-group actor than when responding to an out-group 
actor. This finding addresses the constructs of motivation and capabilities and 
the influence the strategic group appears to have on these elements of the CIP 
model. The analysis of Hypothesis 2 suggests that there is motivation to respond 
to in-group actions. Given this motivation, how would a firm respond? The 
analysis of Hypothesis 4 suggests that firms may respond to in-group actions by 
matching the action. It can be deduced from theory and the current findings that 
the similarity of resource profiles, hence capabilities, may be the operative
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construct in the relationship presented in Hypothesis 4. Firms with similar 
resource profiles have similar capabilities and can better match a response to an 
action. Firms responding to a firm with different resource profiles (i.e., from a 
different group) may not have the full array of capabilities, nor understand how 
the other firm is using its capabilities, to match the action. The responding firm(s) 
formulates a response to answer the interpreted threat, but may not have the 
resource profile to match the action. Although firms appear to respond more 
quickly to distant groups, as suggested by Hypothesis 3, responding firms may 
not have the capability to match the response to the actions.
Hypothesis 5
Although the data did not allow for an empirical test of this hypothesis, the 
qualitative observations may be relevant to the strategic group literature. 
Assessing the behavior of firms within groups is necessary for understanding 
inter-firm interaction at the group level. This type of assessment has been limited 
in previous strategic group research (Baum & Kom, 1996).
The current observations are consistent with the proposition made by 
Chen (1996) regarding competitive asymmetry. This concept holds that firms 
are not symmetrically competitive: Firm A may perceive Firm B as a primary 
competitor, but Firm B perceives Firm C as its primary competitor, not Firm A. 
For example, from the data, when Nucor moves, Chaparral is predominantly the 
first respondent, indicating a consistently strong motivation on the part of 
Chaparral to respond to Nucor. However, when Chaparral acts, Nucor rarely 
responds, but Northwestern is the primary first respondent. This differential
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response order may indicate that Nucor and Northwestern do not interpret the 
actions taken by Chaparral as posing the same level of threat, or that Chaparral 
and Northwestern do not have exactly the same capabilities to respond to Nucor. 
In assessing the differential response between Nucor and Northwestern to an 
action taken by Chaparral, if a lag in awareness of Chaparral’s action is not the 
source of response lag, and differences in capability between the firms is not the 
source of the reaction lag, then the primary component of response lag could be 
the reaction lag attributable to motivation. Given that the CIP model holds that 
the responder assesses the action for information content, the upper echelon of 
Nucor and Northwestern, through their respective sense-making processes, may 
be making different interpretations regarding the degree of threat posed by 
Chaparral's actions.
Based on the observations resulting from the failed empirical analysis of 
Hypothesis 5, there is an indication that the behaviors within group are not 
uniform. Although not statistically testable, the observations of the data form a 
basis for grounded theory and the inter-relationships within groups bear further 
investigation to extend strategic group research into considering firm-level 
behavior within groups.
The observed interactions also make the consideration of first-mover 
advantages within group a potentially fruitful area for further research. Strategic 
Management literature places a heavy emphasis on first-mover advantages 
(Leiberman & Montgomery, 1988). This concept, however, is generally assessed 
at the industry level. It would be expected that each group identified in an
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industry would have one or more consistent first-mover, early-follower, and late- 
follower cohorts. Future assessment of these cohorts is relevant due, in part, to 
the potential performance implications (Leiberman & Montgomery, 1988) within 
group. The identification of these co-horts within a group would perhaps explain 
the equivocal performance findings among firms within groups that has beset 
strategic group research (Barney & Hoskisson, 1990).
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STRATEGIC GROUPS
The finding that groups 2 and 5 are separated by the greatest Euclidean 
distance (i.e., mobility barriers) reinforces our intuitive reasoning about this 
industry: 'integrateds' and 'minimills' form very distinct groupings. Even though 
no dummy variable was set to capture the inherent difference between integrated 
firms (group 2) and minimill firms (group 5), the difference in this dimension was 
captured by the resource variables identified for inclusion in the cluster analysis.
Prior research on strategic groupings in this industry has broken the 
industry into 'integrateds' and 'minimills' on the basis of qualitative assignment. 
The cluster method, using product scope and resource variables, not only 
reinforced this finding, but also indentified two additional groupings within the 
U.S. integrated category. Therefore, in the strictest sense of strategic group 
theory, it is incorrect to identify the industry as being comprised of only two 
groups.
While the groups were identified using an accepted empirical 
methodology, there is the opportunity to bridge the quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies of the strategic group literature. Porac and Thomas (1990), 
Bogner and Thomas (1993), and Reger and Huff (1993) advocate going beyond 
the quantitative tradition, to apply qualitative techniques to capture the cognitive 
aspect of strategic groups. The empirical support for Hypotheses 1 through 4 
provides evidence that the quantitatively obtained objective groupings may 
influence interaction among firms in and between groups. The next step in this 
line of research is to determine the strategic groupings by applying a qualitative
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method similar to that used by Reger and Huff (1993) to capture the cognitive 
schema at work in the industry. This would allow the empirical comparison of 
the findings and provide for an empirical extension of the theoretical work of 
Bogner and Thomas (1993). By comparing and combining the results obtained 
through varying methodologies, we obtain more complete theories.
The concentrated groupings of foreign firms in the U.S. steel industry are 
also an interesting finding resulting from this study. Foreign firms were included 
in groups 3, 4, and 6, even though this was not an attribute directly captured in 
the grouping methodology. Among themselves, these firms utilize similar 
resource capabilities and comparable product scope to compete in the U.S. steel 
industry. It is also not surprising that, during this time period, the firms in groups 
3, 4, and 6 made more international moves than firms in groups 1, 2, and 5. 
According to the literature on environmental scanning, the Asian and European 
markets would have had greater saliency for groups 3, 4, and 6 (Boyd & Fulk, 
1996). When it comes to the lack of out-group response to these international 
actions, the explanation from Communication-lnformation Theory would be that 
the U.S. groups (1, 2, and 5) were not aware of the actions, or if aware did not 
interpret these international actions as credible; if they did, they may have 
perceived that they did not have the capability to respond.
Many of the international moves made by firms in groups 3, 4, and 6 were 
relationship-building actions with steel companies in the Soviet Union, China, 
Vietnam and greater Asia, or moves to establish presence for Europe 1992. An 
enlightening extension to this research would be to identify whether the non­
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response of U.S. firms was due to a lack of motivation (i.e., no threat was 
interpreted) or due to an assessment of a lack of capability to reply to these 
actions.
Non-response to the international actions of groups 3, 4, and 6 also brings 
to light the potential impact of governmental regulations and trade barriers on the 
Communication-lnformation Processing Model of Competitive Interaction. 
Because prior research on the model has not included an international 
component, the relationship of governmental regulations and trade barriers on 
response/non-response behavior has not been addressed. Thus, for example, 
did U.S. firms not respond to actions to form market relationships in Vietnam due 
to lack of awareness, motivation, and capability or to the existence of 
governmental proscriptions against Vietnam? The same question could be 
posed regarding the other international actions taken and the existence of either 
real or perceived trade barriers. Although governmental regulations and trade 
barriers might be broadly categorized under the "capabilities" construct of the 
model, they should be separately identified, perhaps as environmental 
constraints on firm-level capabilities, and assessed for their relationship to 
response, response likelihood, and response lag.
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EMPIRICAL AND BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS 
Competitive Intensity
Because the number of responses to actions increased over the period, 
when compared to the relatively flat growth of the actions taken over the period, 
a response/action ratio was calculated. Table 14 gives the result of this 
calculation. It reveals that the competitive intensity of the industry, as measured 
by total responses per year in proportion to total actions taken per year, 
increased during the period of the study.
Table 14 
Competitive Intensity
Year Price R/A Ratio
Non-Price 
R/A Ratio
Total 
R/A Ratio
1993 2.5 .18 .91
1992 3.05 .19 .55
1991 1.53 .06 .20
As seen in Table 14, the competitive intensity of the industry increased 
over the period of the study from a Total Response/Action ratio of .20 to .91 This 
indicates that actions were generating more responses in 1993 than in 1991. 
Although not a specific focus of this study, this finding does merit explanation. 
According to the running editorial commentary and reporting in the American 
Metal Market, the market for steel and steel products was characterized as 
improving over the period with forecasts of increases in demand and sales. Such 
increases characterize a munificent environment. On the surface, this data
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suggests that competitive interaction increases with environmental munificence. 
This is certainly contrary to the propositions of Hannan and Freeman (1977), who 
argue that rivalry increases when resources in the niche are low and decreases 
when resources are abundant. Because of this potential contrary finding, the 
relationship between munificence and competitive interaction should be 
specifically tested in other industry contexts.
Boundary Spanners
Examination of the relationships of actions and responses between firms 
and among groups highlighted the existence of "boundary-spanning" firms. For 
example, there were several occasions where Bethlehem (group 2) responded 
directly to a move made by Nucor (group 5). However, when other firms in group 
2 responded, the response was reported as being to Bethlehem, not Nucor. In 
this way the awareness and significance of an external action was communicated 
to the group at large, through the actions of the initial group respondent. This 
same type of behavior was observed for Nucor for actions occurring in Group 2 
and 6. This observed behavior could arise from two possible sources: (1) the 
groups were incorrectly defined by the clustering algorithm and the 
product/resource variables chosen; and, (2) the period in question represents a 
transition period in the structure of the strategic groups.
It is not directly possible to determine if the observation of boundary- 
spanning behavior is the result of incorrectly drawn groups. However, the 
empirical results of the study suggesting support for the hypothesized 
relationships provide an indication that the groups, for this study, were not
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incorrectly identified. This problem would be greatly clarified by comparing the 
results between objectively and subjectively derived groupings as suggested 
earlier. The comparison would either substantiate the boundary spanning 
behavior, or indicate that it was an artifact of incorrectly identified groups (i.e., 
that a firm "should" have been categorized in group X rather than group Y). If the 
latter is not the case, then the existence of boundary-spanning behavior in firms 
from different strategic groups is an area that merits further research. This would 
signify that, not only do firms utilize group members as referents, but a few 
specific firms utilize out-group firms as referents as well, and, by their response 
to this out-group action, provide an in-group action to which other in-group firms 
may respond.
The behavior may also be the result of a transition in the structure of 
strategic groups. Although it has been demonstrated that strategic groups are 
stable over long periods of time, group membership does change. The 
boundary-spanning behavior observed in this study may indicate that firms are in 
the process of transitioning from one group to another. Previously, research on 
strategic groups captured the change in groups in a static manner: in year X a 
firm was a member of group A, in year X+5 a member of group B. The concept of 
a dynamic transition of firms from one group to another reinforces the proposition 
made by Bogner and Thomas (1993) that economic transactions lay the 
groundwork for the objective dimensions of group structure, and provide for the 
emergence of the subjective, cognitive groups which frame future transactions. 
From the perspective of Peteraf and Shanley (1997), the boundary-spanning
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firms may be undergoing a change in strategic group identity, modeling their 
competitive behavior and actions after a new group of referents. By applying the 
model and methodology used in this study, a more dynamic picture of group 
change and firm transition from group to group, with emphasis on the reasons for 
transition, would be obtained. This would be a significant extension of the 
strategic group literature, providing richer information on why and how groups 
evolve.
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LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
A limitation on the study’s findings results from the focus on a single 
industry. A broader test of the hypotheses to several industries concurrently 
would provide a more rigorous test for the influence of strategic groups on the 
response variables of the CIP model. Few strategic group studies, however, 
have considered more than one industry at a time. A noted exception is found in 
Hergert (1987).
The dependence on an archival newspaper source is the greatest 
limitation to the application of the particular methodology applied in this study. 
The requirement that specific terminology be present to record an event as a 
response limited the number of responses to actions. Although it may have been 
deduceable that a move by a firm was indeed a response to a specific action of 
another firm, if the article did not include "responding to . . ., following . . ., similar 
to . . ., in response to . . ., etc.” or other key phrases clearly linking a response to 
an action, the move could not be coded as a response. However, since the 
publications that cover this industry on a daily basis are limited, and other 
industries face this same constraint in press coverage, this is not a limitation that 
is easily overcome. Rather than using a retrospective methodology (i.e., 
reviewing past issues of a specific trade publication) a more prospective 
methodology might be warranted. The problem here, however, is the length of 
time (years) necessary to accumulate sufficient actions and responses for 
analysis. The positive contribution of a more prospective method would be that, 
with the participation of key decision makers at firms in the focal industry, the
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correlates of awareness, motivation, and capabilities within groups could be more 
closely examined. This type of design would certainly contribute to a greater 
understanding of how strategic groups influence awareness, motivation and 
capability. For example, the empirical support for Hypothesis 3 suggests that 
firms in group 2 are more motivated to respond to firms in group 5, the most 
distant group, than to groups that are more proximal (groups 1, 3, 4). Using a 
prospective method with key informants would allow the research to probe why 
the actions from the furthest group are perceived to be a greater threat. It is not 
possible to do this using a retrospective method.
Another shortcoming of the method lies in the journalistic approach to 
reporting on the focal industry. If the time between action and response is long, 
the reporter/editor may not reference the firm making, or the date of, an initial 
action. This may have resulted in “actions" which would have more appropriately 
been classified as responses. Again, due to the retrospective nature of the 
methodology applied, longitudinal studies in this areas will suffer from the same 
limitation. In contrast, a prospective longitudinal design would permit the 
researcher to ask specific questions to tease out whether a move is indeed an 
action, or a much-delayed response to another firm's move. The next step in this 
line of inquiry, then, is to develop and apply a prospective, longitudinal research 
design that addresses some of the questions raised by the results of the current 
study.
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CONTRIBUTIONS 
This study makes several contributions to the two theory bases upon 
which it was founded. First, it is the only major large-scale replication of Chen's 
work to date that extends the generalizability of the CIP model of competitive 
interaction to the manufacturing sector. It substantiates several of the key 
constructs (response lag, response likelihood, response order) of this research 
stream and their validity outside the fast-paced, highly interactive U.S. airline 
industry. Second, the support for the hypotheses corroborates the proposition of 
the CIP literature base that homophily has an influence in inter-firm 
communication and information and, hence, competitive interaction. This 
concept had been proposed, but never directly incorporated in an empirical study 
of the Communication-lnformation Processing Model of Competitive Interaction. 
The empirical support for Hypotheses 1 through 4 suggest that the relationships 
between homophily and competitive interaction and strategic groups and 
competitive interaction are transitive. As an equivalent construct, strategic 
groups may have similar influences on awareness, capability and motivation as 
homophily is proposed to have. Although the relationships may be deduced from 
theory, the findings of this study lay the foundation to examine the specific 
influence that the strategic group construct has on awareness, motivation and 
capability using finer-grained research methodologies than those previously 
applied in strategic group research.
The contributions to the strategic group research stream are just as 
significant. First and foremost is the evidence that strategic groups may have an
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impact on competitive interaction, as captured by the Communication-lnformation 
Processing Model. Response lag, response likelihood and response type are 
associated with the similarity of group membership between actor and responder; 
with group membership capturing the characteristic of similarity among in-group 
firms along product/market scope and resources. The major contribution here is 
the potential inverted U-shaped relationship between response lag and mobility 
barriers and the match/non-match of response made to in-group and out-group 
actions. This finding implies that, from a responding firm's perspective, close 
firms (in-group) and distant firms (out-group) are both rivals, but that motivation 
to respond and the response type reflects the source of the action. The 
implication is that, within group, firms move quickly to respond to and match the 
actions of other in-group firms, while they respond quickly, but may not be 
capable of matching the actions of firms in distant groups. Thus, while both in­
group and distant out-group actions may motivate a response exhibiting a low 
response lag, (i.e., both are perceived as threats), the different resource profiles 
across groups limits the degree to which the responder can mount a quick, 
matching response to distant out-group actions
As previously stated throughout the presentation of this study, the 
strategic group construct was used as a proxy for the homophily contruct. Most 
strategic group research has focused on group formation, stability and the 
relationship to performance (Barney & Hoskisson, 1994). It has rarely been 
applied as a construct outside of the traditional I/O economics stream as a 
means to explain, support, or refute relationships in models and theories in other
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areas of Strategic Management research (Bogner, 1993).
Identifying the apparent equivalency of the strategic group construct with 
the homphily construct, therefore, is a significant contribution to the strategic 
group research stream. The findings of support for Hypotheses 1 through 4 lend 
credence to the continued use of the strategic group construct in Strategic 
Management research. Contrary to the suggestions made by Barney and 
Hoskisson (1990), the strategic group construct has validity, and is not a mere 
artifact of methodology. The discovery that the strategic group construct-based 
on the similarity of entities in a group-reflects the relationships proposed of a 
construct from a different field, itself based on the similarity of individuals in a 
communication-information exchange, signifies that the strategic group construct 
in not merely an artifact. The identification of a potential relationship between the 
strategic group construct and the elements of the CIP model indicate that 
strategic groups have an influence on behavior of the firms within them.
If the strategic group were not an equivalent construct to homophily, it 
would not have demonstrated the expected results. Had this been the case, the 
study would have found that the strategic group construct is not equivalent to 
homophily and that the strategic group does not influence competitive interaction. 
If the strategic group construct were a mere artifact, it wouid not have served as 
a proxy for a similar construct from an unrelated theory base. The study's 
findings reinforce the theoretical arguments of the role of strategic groups in firm 
and group behavior (Bogner & Thomas, 1993) and augments the credibility of the 
few empirical works (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1994) that have begun to examine
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firm-level behavior within groups.
A potentially significant contribution to the strategic group stream of 
research is the possible discovery of a response hierarchy, or pecking order, 
within strategic groups. Feigenbaum, Hart and Schendel (1996) suggest that 
firms utilize other group members as referents. The finding from the current 
study suggests that a dominant referent may exist within a group, and also 
suggests that not all firms are referents for all other firms within the group. 
Clarification of the referent role and relationships among firms in groups and the 
role these referents have regarding group- or firm-level conduct is needed. A 
second contribution to strategic group research is the potential existence of 
boundary spanning firms. Further research may reveal that these firms are, 
indeed, in two different groups, or are transitioning from one group to another. 
Strategic group research has historically focused at the group level, typically 
considering conduct within groups as unimportant. Moving towards a 
consideration of the firm-level behaviors within group would help to clarify firm-to- 
group transition and its antecedents. A better understanding of group-level and 
firm-level interaction may also serve to guide research into a clarification of the 
influence between the strategic group and performance relationship.
Finally, the inclusion of international companies operating in the U.S. 
market of the focal industry makes an important contribution to the CIP model. 
The non-response of firms in predominantly U.S. firm-comprised groups to the 
actions of foreign firm-comprised groups suggests that there may be other 
structural factors, which would enter the CIP model as elements of the
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competitive environment, that influence the interaction between domestic and 
foreign firms operating in the domestic market of the focal industry. 
Contributions to Managers
Most strategic group studies have been conducted to examine the 
relationship between groups and performance, with little attention to the conduct, 
or behavior, of firms within groups. This is slowly changing, as recent studies 
suggest (Baum & Kom, 1996). Strategic group studies have suggested few 
contributions to managers. As strategic group studies further investigate the 
relationships between the group construct and manifestations of conduct, or 
behavior, such as response lag, the construct may become more relevant to 
practicing managers. This study suggests an association between group 
membership and conduct. An emerging understanding of this relationship may 
better help managers realize the potential constraints of their cognitive schema, 
decision outcomes, and resulting group structures on their actions and responses 
in the competitive arena.
Response lag has been shown to be related to performance (Chen & 
Hambrick, 1995). In prior studies the determinants of response lag have been 
represented by organizational variables, such as organizational slack, size, and 
external orientation (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). The present study 
indicates that industry structure, in terms of strategic groups, is also associated 
with response lag. Thus, while it may benefit the organization to drive response 
lag down to zero, only a portion of the determinants may be directly influenced by 
managerial discretion. The strategic groupings in the industry, as a determinant
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of response lag, are only slowly altered by managerial decision, as evidenced by 
group stability over time. This factor renders the effects of the strategic group 
persistent over a time period.
This study also lends support to the contention made by Feigenbaum and 
Thomas (1994) that group actions reinforce group norms, as members are more 
likely to respond to members and more likely to match in-group actions. 
Managers must question, however, the appropriateness of matching actions 
within the action/response context. Is a matching response taken because it is 
the most expedient course, or would a non-matching action be more 
appropriate? In this decision, the cost of the response lag, in terms of potential 
market share and credibility, needs to be weighed with the potential costs and 
benefits of "pushing the envelope" of the firm's capabilities to formulate a non­
matching response. Can every response to a group action be non-matching? 
Perhaps not. But, managers should realize that some degree of their response 
discretion is bound by the past actions and decisions which, over time, have 
given rise to the group structure of their industries. An understanding of the 
influences of group structure may provide managers clearer insight on when it 
may be more beneficial to "go with the flow" or buck the trend.
What about non-matching response to out-group actions? A non­
matching response may be appropriate in the initial stages of out-group 
response, to communicate to the out-group firm(s) that the action will not go 
uncontested. However, at some point the managers of responding firms must
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assess the limitation of their capabilities and either cede to the incursion of the 
out-group, or invest in extending/increasing the capabilities of the firm.
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FUTURE RESEARCH
The current study could not assess the direct association between 
strategic group membership and awareness, motivation and capability. This 
assessment was not within the intention, scope or design of the study. The 
present research achieved its goal: identifying the influence of the strategic
group on the CIP model due to its nature as a proxy for homophily. Had this 
equivalence not existed, there would be no basis for determining the relationship 
between the strategic group, awareness, motivation, and capability. With the 
apparent equivalence of the strategic group construct and the homohily construct 
established, the investigation of the relationships with and the direct influence of 
the strategic group on awareness, motivation and capability is warranted. 
Studies in this vein would allow for a better understanding of how firms view, 
understand, and process information exchange, in terms of competitive 
interactions, with in-group firms and out-group firms. Why, for example, the 
apparent inverted U-shaped relationship between mobility barrier hieght and 
response lag. Is this the result of managerial discretion or a manifestation of 
determinism, an old and on-going debate in organizational science (Hrebiniak & 
Snow, 1985).
Direct assessment of the relationship between the strategic group and 
awareness for example, would allow for the theory base resulting from studies in 
environmental scanning to be applied. We would expect that in-group firms 
would be more salient to a potential responder than out-group firms and, due to 
this saliency, be more frequently scanned for information (Boyd & Fulk, 1994).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
But this type of environmental scanning research has not been conducted at the 
strategic group level. Direct assessment of the relationship between awareness, 
motivation, and capability and the strategic group construct would also allow for 
an analysis of the sense-making and decision-making processes at work and the 
potential influence, if any, of the strategic group. There is preliminary evidence 
(Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1994) that firms reinforce group conduct. Closer 
investigation of the sensemaking process within the CIP framework and group 
influence would probe this preliminary finding.
The suggestion brought out in the discussion of the study findings that 
awareness and capability may interact to influence the decision type (i.e., 
programmed, non-programmed) made by the firm is an interesting one. This 
potential interaction between awareness, capability, group membership and 
decision type underscores the interactive nature of the structural and cognitive 
aspects of organizational science and deserves to be addressed. For example, 
under what conditions are programmed versus non-programmed decisions 
applied to responses to actions, both in-group and out-group? Does the 
composition of the upper echelon (the top-management team) mediate the 
relationship between actor, responder, group membership and the most likely 
decision type applied?
Another area of investigation further probes the relationship between 
response lag and mobility barrier height. First, is this finding in the focal industry 
constrained by economic factors (i.e., recession) of the early 1990's from which 
the data were taken? Second, is this finding generalizable to other industries?
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Third, does this relationship hold over a longer period of time, or is it a dynamic 
one that may change over a long period of time, as cognitive schemas, business- 
level strategies, top management teams, and industry conditions change? 
Regardless, the present findings suggest that we question our understanding of 
the role of mobility barriers in strategic group research and also question the 
justification of the relative conceptual equivalence between strategic distance 
and mobility barries, as operationalized by the Euclidean distance resulting from 
cluster analysis.
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SUMMARY
This study bridged the Communication-lnformation Processing Model of 
Competitive Interaction and the strategic group literature of Strategic 
Management. The CIP model presents communication-information theory as a 
means of modeling, analyzing, and understanding competition among firms in an 
industry. This is a comparatively new theoretical approach in Strategic 
Management, beginning in the mid-1980s. The strategic group literature takes its 
root in Bain (1956). The groups present within industries are purported to result 
from the choices top-level managers make regarding their firm’s strategic profile, 
asset base, product/market scope, and resource allocations. These choices 
constrain future decisions.
From the intersection of these two streams of research hypotheses were 
developed and tested. The empirical results suggest that strategic groups may 
have an influence on the response dynamics of competitive interaction, more 
specifically, that firms are more likely to respond, and respond more quickly, to 
within-group actions than to actions from outside the group.
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Business Policy & Strategy
Tidewater Tech, Norfolk, Virginia (1996)
Computer Concepts, Introduction to Windows, Wordprocessing I & II, Database 
Management
Academic Services, Old Dominion University (1996-1997)
Tutored at-risk students in several business subjects, economics, and statistics
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